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ABSTRACT
Patient safety in healthcare has become a national objective. Healthcare
organizations are striving to improve patient safety and have turned to high reliability
organizations as those in which to model. One initiative taken on by healthcare is
improving patient safety culture—shifting from one of a ‘no harm, no foul’ to a culture of
learning that encourages the reporting of errors, even those in which patient harm does
not occur. Lacking from the literature, however, is an understanding of how safety culture
impacts outcomes. While there has been some research done in this area, and safety
culture is argued to have an impact, the findings are not very diagnostic. In other words,
safety culture has been studied such that an overall safety culture rating is provided and it
is shown that a positive safety culture improves outcomes. However, this method does
little to tell an organization what aspects of safety culture impact outcomes. Therefore,
this dissertation sought to answer that question but analyzing safety culture from multiple
dimensions. The results found as a part of this effort support previous work in other
domains suggesting that hospital management and supervisor support does lead to
improved perceptions of safety. The link between this support and outcomes, such as
incidents and incident reporting, is more difficult to determine. The data suggests that
employees are willing to report errors when they occur, but the low occurrence of such
reportable events in healthcare precludes them from doing so. When a closer look was
taken at the type of incidents that were reported, a positive relationship was found
between support for patient safety and medication incidents. These results initially seem
counterintuitive. To suggest a positive relationship between safety culture and medication
incidents on the surface detracts from the research in other domains suggesting the
iii

opposite. It could be the case that an increase in incidents leads an organization to
implement additional patient safety efforts, and therefore employees perceive a more
positive safety culture. Clearly more research is needed in this area. Suggestions for
future research and practical implications of this study are provided.
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SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
We live in a world that is filled with complexity and errors, especially within
health care. Advances in technology, and a growing and aging population further
complicate an already taxed system. As Gene Kranz (2000) entitled his book, “Failure is
not an option”, particularly when the lives of millions seeking safe healthcare treatment
are at risk. Unfortunately, given the complexity and ambiguity of many tasks, long hours
on-the-job, and difficult vigilance duties, even the most diligent and conscientious
clinician will make errors (Leape, 1994; Risser, Rice, Salisbury et al., 1999). Reason
(1990) has defined human error as any “occasion in which a planned sequence of mental
or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome” either as a result of an
inadequate plan or intended actions not going as planned (p. 9).
In an effort to protect humans (e.g., patients, staff), laws, regulations and
governing agencies have been developed (e.g., Joint Commission for the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations, JCAHO). State and federal regulations abound requiring
hospitals to have safety initiatives in place and to report errors that cause harm to a
patient or employee. However, despite these safety laws and regulations for
organizations, a significant number of incidents continue to occur each year. The widely
recognized Institute of Medicine report entitled “To Err is Human”, details that each year
between 44,000 to 98,000 Americans are thought to be harmed as a result of medical
errors. Furthermore, research suggests that preventable adverse events are a leading cause
of death in the United States (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999). Approximately 15
1

million incidents of patient harm occur in US hospitals each year (Institute for Health
Improvement, 2006), with top performing hospitals operating with 40% fewer errors than
the lowest performing hospitals (healthgrades.com, 2007). Furthermore, some have
estimated that approximately 70% of reported errors were preventable and at least 50% of
errors that occur in healthcare are not reported (Leape, 1994). In most cases, the
individual (e.g., doctor, nurse) does not intentionally commit the errors but these efforts
found that the root of human error stems from many different sources including, but not
limited to, faulty systems, inadequate training, procedures and/or safety culture (e.g.,
Helmreich & Merritt, 2000; Mearns & Flin, 1998; Wilson, Priest, Salas, & Burke, 2005).
The healthcare community has a number of taboos and perverse incentives that
have helped to sustain a strong culture of resistance and secrecy around reporting and
addressing errors and failure (e.g., ‘no harm, no foul’). Admittedly, there will always be
the risk of error where human operators are involved (“to err is human”). However, there
are steps that organizations can take to reduce dangerous, sometimes lethal, incidents that
stem from a poor safety culture. The dramatic rise in patient safety as a national
healthcare policy initiative in the United States and a number of other industrialized
nations has stimulated sustained dialogue about systems redesign, advancement of
medical education and training, and culture change with the goal of moving towards a
system such that errors are minimized. But process towards high reliability is slow and
arduous and much can be learned from other industries such as aviation and nuclear
power.
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Despite the inevitability of human error, there are organizations operating in
complex environments that are able to maintain an exceptionally safe workplace. These
organizations, such as those within aviation and nuclear power, have been termed high
reliability organizations (HROs). For example, the commercial aviation industry (Part
121 Scheduled Air Carriers) experienced only 25 accidents in 2006, two of which
included

fatalities—49

total

fatalities

to

be

exact

(http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table6.htm). These figures are exceptionally small
considering the almost eight billion miles flown that year and millions of passengers
aboard these flights. Due to their excellent safety records and continued effectiveness,
high reliability organizations have received an increasing amount of attention within the
past 15 years and other organizations, such as those in healthcare (e.g., pediatric cardiac
surgery units; Carthey, de Leval, Wright, Farewell, & Reason, 2003), are striving to
evolve to high reliability status (Weick & Roberts, 1993). One way that this is
accomplished is by developing a culture in which safety and learning are a priority.
However, limited theoretically-based research exists regarding the impact of these efforts.
A search of the literature indicated 78 articles which empirically look at safety culture.
However, only six of those focused on the impact of safety culture or climate on
outcomes (e.g., errors, injury rates), whereas 10 focused on safety culture or climate on
safe behaviors or participation in safety activities. Furthermore, many of these studies
examined the impact of safety culture as a whole rather than what aspects of safety
culture impacted outcomes. For example, Hofmann and Mark (2006) found that overall
safety climate was significantly related to medication errors but it was not indicated as to
3

which aspects of safety climate most influenced these errors. It is not surprising that there
is limited research in this area. This type of data is difficult to collect due to factors from
limited time and resources, difficulty identifying a clear criterion and in general the low
occurrence of incidents within HROs. In addition, criterion measures are difficult to
identify and it is hard to control the various extraneous variables that may influence (e.g.,
moderate, mediate) the relationship between safety culture and clinical outcomes.

Purpose of the Current Study
Typical patient safety initiatives have focused on improving micro-levels of the
organization (e.g., better training and education for staff). While this is one approach, it
should not be the only approach (i.e., training and education alone may not be enough).
Taking a lesson from high reliability organizations, healthcare organizations are now
approaching patient safety from a macro-perspective. One way that this is being done is
by addressing the organization's safety culture and climate. Much of the healthcare
research examining safety culture and climate focuses on what impacts it and how to
improve it. Research examining the impact of safety culture on clinical outcomes is
virtually non-existent. Thus, the research proposed here seeks to investigate this seldom
studied relationship.
Figure 1 provides the overarching framework for this dissertation. Specifically,
this research will utilize high reliability theory (HRT) as an organizing framework and
will focus on the relationship between high reliability values at the organizational level as
they are manifested through employee perceptions (i.e., perceptions of safety culture) and
4

finally its impact on patient safety outcomes. Figure 2 presents a model that depicts the
hypothesized relationships among variables in the proposed study. According to this
model, the relationship between perceptions of organizational/supervisory support for
safety (e.g., feedback and communication about errors) and outcomes are mediated by
perceptions of staff level variables, such as teamwork and communication openness. The
testing of this model should provide researchers with a better understanding of the impact
of actions at all levels of the organization influence patient safety. Methodologically, this
study will utilize perceptions of safety culture collected from employees within five
critical care units at seven campuses within one large Central Florida hospital. Patient
safety outcome data will be obtained from both survey-based data and various units
responsible for maintaining incident databases within the hospital. Data analysis will
utilize a multi-level approach further adding to the current research available in the
literature.
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High Reliability Theory

Organization
level

Perceptions
of Safety
Culture

Patient Safety
Outcomes

Sensitivity to
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Reluctance to
Simplify

Deference to
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 Supervisor expectations about safety
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 Organizational learning
 Teamwork
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 Incidents
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 Patient safety grade
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 Non-punitive response to error
 Willingness to report events
 Staffing

 Number of events reported
 Unit reporting rates
 Staff turnover

Figure 1. High reliability theory as a guiding framework
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of hypothesized relationships
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Patient Safety
Grade

SECTION 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW
Safety Culture and Climate
It is clearly being recognized that facilitating a safety culture in which we learn
from errors is critical to a safe environment for patients and employees. For example, the
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, signed by President Bush in 2005,
establishes federal protections “against discovery and unauthorized disclosure of data
arising from patient safety and quality improvement programs. It also provides for
certification of patient safety organizations to which healthcare organizations can report
this data” (http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/532889?rss). Outside of the U.S.,
similar efforts ensue and building a safety culture is the first step of the U.K. National
Patient Safety Association’s 7 Steps to Patient Safety (NPSA, 2004).
One way that an organization’s commitment to safety is manifested is through its
values, and these values translate to the organization’s safety culture. The safety culture
is then observable through the actions and attitudes of management and employees. In
this section, a brief discussion of safety culture is provided. Also relevant to this
discussion is the distinction between safety culture and safety climate. While some argue
that safety culture is most influential in terms of employee actions and attitudes, others
argue that it is the safety climate. Further complicating the issue is the fact that others
have argued that there is no difference between the two concepts, and the terms are often
used interchangeably (e.g., Denison, 1996). Despite the efforts by researchers to define
safety culture, making the distinction between safety culture and safety climate has
8

clearly encountered definitional issues (see Tables 1-3). Pidgeon (2001) states “there is
currently not enough consistent (or published) data to be able to test the reliability of
existing definitions or measures” of safety culture and climate (p. 54). However, more
recent publications (e.g., Zhang et al., 2002) have attempted to solve such definitional
issues evident in the safety literature. Furthermore, a number of surveys measuring an
organization’s safety culture and climate have been developed and validated in the
literature (see Singla, Kitch, Weissman, & Campbell, 2006) (more later). While past
efforts to define these constructs were classified as “unsystematic” and “fragmented”
(Zhang et al., 2002, p. 4), a comparison of safety culture and climate by way of the
available literature did yield some clear delineation between the two.

Table 1
Characteristics of Safety Culture and Climate
Safety Culture
• Refers to shared values among organization
members, defined at the group level.
• Concerned with formal safety issues.
• Relatively enduring, resistant to change, and

stable.
• Emphasizes contribution from people at
every level of the organization.
• Impacts member behavior.
• Reflected in the convergence between reward
systems and safety structure.
• Reflected in an organization’s willingness to
learn from errors, accidents, and incidents.
Note: Table adapted from Zhang et al., 2002.
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Safety Climate
• Refers to perceptions, a
psychological phenomenon, of
safety at a particular time.
• Concerned with intangible issues
(e.g., situational factors)
• Unstable ands subject to change.
• Temporal phenomena, described as

a “snapshot” of safety culture.

Table 2
Definitions of safety culture from the literature
Definition of safety culture
“The objective measurement of attitudes and
perceptions toward occupational health and safety
issues.”
“The collection of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and
practices one uses while going about daily activities,
including management decision in a broader context.”
“‘Culture’ is a more complex and enduring trait
reflecting fundamental norms, values, and
assumptions that to some extent reside in societal
culture.”
“A set of norms, beliefs, attitudes and practices,
regarding universal precautions, shared between
people in a certain place at a certain time.”
“Where staff within an organisation have a constant
and active awareness of the potential for things to go
wrong. Both the staff and the organisation are able to
acknowledge mistakes, learn from them, and take
action to put things right.”
“One in which safety is everyone’s concern and there
is an acknowledgement that errors can and will
occur.”
“The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in
organizations and individuals which establishes that,
as an overriding priority,…safety issues receive the
attention warranted by their significance. Safety
culture is attitudinal as well as structural, relates both
to organizations and individuals, and concerns the
requirements to match all safety issues with
appropriate perceptions and action.”
“The product of individual and group values, attitudes,
perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior
that determine the commitment to, and the style and
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety
management.”

Domain
General

Reference
Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams
(1995, p. 247)

General

Toft & Reynolds (1994), as
cited in Kumar & Simpson
(2005, p. 330)
Goodman (2003, p. 25)

Healthcare

Healthcare

Lymer, Richt, & Isaksson
(2004, p. 548)

Healthcare

National Patient Safety
Agency (2004, p. 2)

Healthcare

Dennis (2005, p. 51)

Nuclear

International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group
(1991), as cited in
Sorensen (2002)

Nuclear
Health and Safety
(adopted by Commission (1993, p. 23);
healthcare) adopted by Glendon &
Stanton (2000); Galvan et
al. (2005); Lee & Harrison
(2000); McCarthy &
Blumenthal (2006); Harvey
et al. (2001); Cox et al.
(2006)
Nuclear
Lee (1993), as cited in
“All forms of learned behaviors which ‘add up to a
Harvey, Erdos, Bolam,
shared commitment to think safely, to behave safely
Cox, Kennedy & Gregory
and toe believe and trust in the safety measures put in
(2002, p. 19)
place by the organization.’”
“The safety culture of an organization is the product of Nuclear
Health and Safety
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions,
Commission (of Great
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Definition of safety culture
competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine
the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of,
an organization’s health and safety management.”
“A subset of organizational culture, where the beliefs
and values refer specifically to matters of health and
safety.”
“The shared and learned meanings, experiences and
interpretations of work and safety—expressed
partially symbolically—which guide peoples’ actions
towards risks, accidents and prevention.”
“A temporal manifestation of culture, which is
reflected in the shared perceptions of the organization
at a discrete point in time.”

Domain

Railway

Clarke (1999, p. 185)

Manufacturing

Richter & Koch (2004, p.
705)

Offshore
Oil

Cox & Cheyne (2000, p.
114)

Table 3
Definitions of safety climate from the literature
Definition of safety climate
Domain
“The term ‘climate’ best describes employee Healthcare
perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes.”
“A subset of organizational climate, defined
Healthcare
primarily in terms of employees’ perceptions.
Safety climate is the safety culture, such as it
appears to and is assessed by specific
healthcare workers.”
“Molar perceptions people have of their work Construction
settings.”
“A summary of molar perceptions that
employees share about their work
environments.”
“A set of perceptions or beliefs held by an
individual and/or group about a particular
entity.”
“Perceptions of management's commitment
to safety, employee ownership of safety
related issues, stereotyping of safety
conscious employees, adherence to safety
rules and procedures, and the existence of
proactive approaches to managing safety.”
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Reference
Britain (1993)

Reference
Goodman (2003,
p. 25)
Coyle et al.
(1995), as cited in
Lymer et al. (2004,
p. 548)

Industrial
organizations

Dedobbeleer &
Beland (1991, p.
97)
Zohar (1980, p.
96)

Manufacturing/
Produce

Brown & Holmes
(1986, p. 455)

Manufacturing

Garavan, &
O’Brien (2001, p.
146)

Based primarily on the research revolving around organizational culture, the term
safety culture did not become ‘popularized’ until the late 1980s following the Chernobyl
disaster (e.g., Mearns & Flin, 1999; Glendon & Stanton, 2000). It was cited, for the first
time, that a poor safety culture contributed to this major catastrophe (Zhang, Wiegmann,
von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002). The atomic and nuclear power plant industries
began the push to define safety culture and were quickly joined by other industries
experiencing their own disasters (e.g., King’s Cross fire, Piper Alpha oil platform
explosion, Challenger and Columbia space shuttle disasters; see Pidgeon, 1998; Pidgeon
& O’Leary, 2000; Reason, 1990; Zhang et al., 2002). The Institution of Occupational
Safety and Health (1994, as cited in Glendon & Stanton, 2000) reviewed the many
definitions of safety culture and narrowed them down to three. Their findings suggest that
the meaning of a safety culture includes or refers to: (1) aspects of organizational culture
that related to safety (e.g., norms, policies), (2) common values, beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors regarding safety, and (3) the joint values, attitudes, competencies, and
behaviors of individuals and groups that establishes an organization’s commitment to,
and style and proficiency of its safety program. Similarly, Pidgeon (1991) argues that
safety culture may be a useful tool in risk management and can be defined under one of
three headings: (1) norms and rules for dealing with risk, (2) attitudes towards safety, and
(3) the capacity to reflect on safety practices. In addition, safety culture can be
approached from two perspectives as: (1) something an organization has (i.e., structures,
practices, controls, and policies designed to promote safety), or (2) something an
12

organization is (i.e., beliefs, values, and attitudes of organizational members regarding
safety; Reason, 1998). Finally, safety culture is recognized as a higher-level construct,
which ultimately influences safety climate. It can be seen from these definitions and from
many others (see Table 2) that safety culture is seen as relating to an individual, group, or
organization’s practices and attitudes.
Safety climate, in comparison to safety culture, is defined more as perceptions
regarding safety rather than practices or attitudes (Guldenmund, 2000) and is a part of
organizational climate (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995). Schneider (1990, as cited in
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998) defines safety climate as an individual's perceptions regarding
events, practices, procedures, and behaviors that are rewarded, supported, and expected
for safety in an organization. Similarly, others define safety climate as the summary of
beliefs and perceptions of workers about safety in organizations (Williamson, Feyer,
Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997; see also Table 3). Unlike safety culture which was derived
from the literature regarding organizational culture, safety climate is rooted more in
empirical research (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; also see Brown & Holmes, 1986; Flin,
Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Williamson et al., 1997; Zohar, 1980) and is most
often assessed by questionnaires attempting to get at certain safety dimensions.

How is a Patient Safety Culture Measured?
Typically, safety culture is measured using self-report surveys, gathering data on
individual perceptions regarding overall perceptions of safety culture or organizational
13

and management support for safety. However, this provides a limited picture of what
factors truly impact safety culture. In other words, safety culture manifests itself in more
ways than just organizational level and management support, namely staff level factors
such as teamwork (see Figure 2). Within healthcare, there are a number of measures
available in the literature that examine the patient safety culture of an organization. It has
been argued in naval and commercial aviation that the administration of safety culture
surveys is a useful component of efforts to improve safety culture (e.g., Sexton, Thomas,
& Helmreich, 2000; Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko et al., 2003), and other communities, such as
healthcare, are following suit. The most comprehensive review of healthcare efforts to
date was conducted by Singla and colleagues (2006), who reviewed 13 different
instruments used within the community. The general purpose of these measures is to
assess attributes of the organization which are malleable, so that interventions can be
introduced within those areas in which a problem is identified. Singla et al. (2006)
reviewed each of the measures to identify the dimensions assessed, as well as to evaluate
the measures for validity and usability. Of these 13 measures, two were selected as being
a cut above the rest—the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Hospital
Survey on Patient Safety (HSOPS) and the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ). These
instruments were selected for their psychometric properties, indicating that these
measures are reliable and valid, as well as for inclusion of dimensions beyond the
organization and management support level, specifically, dimensions related to teamwork
or communication. In addition, both the HSOPS and SAQ surveys provide users with the
ability to benchmark safety culture within one’s unit or hospital with others. Table 4
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compares the dimensions tapped by the HSOPS and SAQ. As will be discussed further in
the methods section, this dissertation focuses on the use of the HSOPS due to the fact that
the inclusion of more dimensions would be more diagnostic of the hospital’s patient
safety culture. For example, instead of generating an overall score for perceptions of
management as measured by the SAQ, the HSOPS breaks this dimension down further to
focus on supervisor expectations and actions promoting safety, organizational learning,
and feedback and communication about errors, to name a few. The dimensions measured
by the HSOPS will be integrated into the discussion provide next, as hypothesized
relationships are proposed.
Table 4
Comparison of dimensions measured by HSOPS and SAQ
HSOPS
SAQ
Patient Safety Grade
Safety climate
Overall Perceptions of Safety
Safety climate
Frequency of Event Reporting (i.e., willingness
Safety Climate
to report errors)
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions
Perceptions of management
promoting safety
Organizational Learning—Continuous
Perceptions of management
improvement
Communication Openness
Perceptions of management/
Teamwork climate
Feedback and Communication about Error
Perceptions of management
Non-punitive Response To Error
Perceptions of management
Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety Perceptions of management
Teamwork Within Hospital Units
Teamwork climate
Teamwork Across Hospital Units
Teamwork climate
Hospital Handoffs & Transitions
Teamwork climate
Staffing
Working conditions
Number of Events Reported
N/A
N/A
Job satisfaction
N/A
Stress recognition
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High Reliability Theory (HRT)
The guiding framework for this dissertation focuses on that of high reliability
theory (HRT). HRT posits that organizations are capable of functioning within hazardous
environments because of their complexity (e.g., components have multiple functions) and
tight coupling (e.g., time dependent operations, specialized personnel) (Rijpma, 1997;
Roberts, 1999; Perrow, 1984). Furthermore, HRT suggests that accidents occur because
human operators of complex systems are not complex enough themselves to sense and
anticipate problems that may be generated by the system (Ruchlin, Dublin, & Callahan,
2004), and therefore, organizations prevent accidents through organizational design and
management (Pizzi, Goldfarb, & Nash, 2001). However, high reliability organizations
also recognize the importance of other levels within the organization that impact safety,
namely technical and social (i.e., teams) redundancies to enhance reliabilities (LaPorte &
Consolini, 1991; Tamuz & Harrison, 2006; Wilson et al., 2005).
To successfully manage the factors at multiple levels, HRT suggests that an
organization’s “mindfulness” or their ability to exhibit “a pattern of heedful interrelations
of actions” (Weick & Roberts, 1993, p. 357) has allowed them to reach their high
reliability status. Furthermore, mindfulness at the organizational level is comprised of a
commitment to certain values and actions—specifically, commitment to resilience,
sensitivity to operations, deference to expertise, reluctance to simplify, and preoccupation
with failure (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Finally, in addition to holding the values
previously mentioned, high reliability organizations enhance their commitment to
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excellence by (a) anticipating dangers that may arise, while coping with dangers that
occur (Wildavsky, 1988), (b) actively seeking knowledge about what they don’t know,
(c) designing reward systems that recognize both the cost of failures and the benefits of
reliability, and (d) communicating the whole picture to all levels of the organization
(Roberts & Bea, 2001). Thus, the successful combination of these values and
characteristics, which are argued here to manifest through a culture of safety, allows high
reliability organizations to reduce and mitigate errors.
One of the most widely discussed instances of HROs, and one that healthcare and
other organizations can learn from, is the US Naval aircraft carrier fleet (Rochlin, La
Porte, & Roberts, 1987). Each carrier, acting like its own ‘organization’, successfully
conducts flight operations at sea while pushing the “edge of the envelope” (Rochlin et al.,
1987, p. 76) in conditions that are extreme, complex, and unpredictable. Furthermore,
while operations manuals are available to dictate specific procedures and tasks at the
micro level, lacking is a discussion of how to integrate this into the greater whole. As if
this weren’t enough, approximately every 40 months, there is almost 100% turnover of
all officers and crew, as each member gets reassigned to a different duty. The ability of
the US Navy to maintain successful operations despite these challenges ensures its status
of high reliability. So, how do they do it? First, the system operates with a set of
redundancies—technical (e.g., computers, radar), supply (e.g., extra aircraft parts),
decision/management (e.g., cross checking and fail-safe redundancy). In addition, the US
Navy addresses the high turnover rate on carriers by training officers with general rather
than specific skills that are transportable from job to job, as well as struggling to maintain
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morale and unit cohesion. Finally, the fleet remains adaptable within its day-to-day
operations (e.g., flight operations, planning) by ‘disregarding’ rank with the interest of
safety. This does not mean that the steep hierarchy of rank is unimportant. Rather, the
organization recognizes that each member brings his/her unique perspective and expertise
to the table and that in some instances, following a chain of command is not practical if a
mishap is to be averted. For example, the lowest ranking individual can suspend flight
operations immediately in the interest of safety without clearance from supervisors.
But critical to the success of HROs is not just organizational support for safety,
but also more micro-levels of the organization. Specifically, individuals and teams
embedded within the organization are a critical factor playing into the success of a high
reliability organization. Wilson et al. (2005) extracted from the high reliability
organization and team literatures, arguing that to become a high reliability team, team
members must exhibit behaviors that facilitate those characteristics and values held by
the organization within which they operate, for example, communication, mutual
performance monitoring, back up behavior, and assertiveness. While the teamwork
behaviors described are those that may be exhibited by non-high reliability teams, high
reliability teams differ in that they are able to consistently and effectively demonstrate
these behaviors over time in complex, dynamic environments while working under high
levels of stress.
Given the success of high reliability in organizations (e.g., naval and commercial
aviation, nuclear), the healthcare community has begun to take strides to achieve this
status. In line with the discussion of US Naval aircraft carriers, healthcare utilizes
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redundant systems at the micro-level, such as technology (e.g., automated medication
dispensing units) and teamwork (e.g., team members monitor performance and call a
“time out” should they feel patient safety is in jeopardy). In addition, a number of macrolevel patient safety initiatives have been taken, including executive walk rounds (e.g.,
Thomas, Sexton, Neilands, Frankel & Helmreich, 2005), Comprehensive Unit-based
Safety Program (CUSP), and crisis resource management training (e.g., Howard, Gaba, et
al., 1992). Each of these serves the purpose of demonstrating management support for
safety, and thus promoting a safety culture within organizations. At the micro-level,
teams in the health care community that may be considered high reliability teams include
(but are not limited to) surgical teams and emergency room teams, or any set of two or
more team members who consistently and effectively work interdependently towards a
shared goal in a complex environment (i.e., high risk environments). In the next section, a
discussion of how the macro and micro levels of the organization relate to safety culture
in organizations.

HRT and Safety Culture
As previously mentioned, there is a set of core values which sets HROs apart
from other organizations—sensitivity to operations, reluctance to simplify interactions,
preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise (Weick
& Sutcliffe, 2001). The first three values aid in anticipating and becoming aware of the
unexpected, as these organizations recognize that “human fallibility is like gravity,
19

weather, and terrain, just another foreseeable hazard” (Reason, 1997, p. 25). In addition,
they enlist two further values—commitment to resilience and deference to expertise—to
contain and mitigate the unexpected. Taken together these values combine to “induce a
state of collective mindfulness that creates a rich awareness of discriminatory detail and
facilitates the discovery and correction of errors” (Weick et al., 1999, p. 81). While these
values are not directly observable, they manifest themselves throughout the organization
(i.e., safety culture) and are thus translated to management and staff attitudes and actions.
In this section, a discussion is provided regarding the research conducted on
safety culture and climate, using the values posited by HRT as a framework. It is
recognized that these values do not operate independently within organizations, however,
the discussion attempts to categorize pockets of the literature under just one category for
succinctness. Furthermore, while this dissertation is focusing on the healthcare industry, a
thorough discussion of safety culture in the community is lacking. Therefore, the search
was broadened to both HRO and non-HRO communities beyond healthcare to provide a
complete picture of the research that has been conducted (see Table A.1 in APPENDIX
A: SUMMARY OF SAFETY CULTURE LITERATURE).

Sensitivity to Operations
Sensitivity to operations is evident within HROs by their concern with the
unexpected, attention to the operational environment and those on the front line, and the
acknowledgement that the cause of an accident is often complex (i.e., not the result of a
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single, active error) (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Building from Reason’s (1990) Swiss
Cheese Model regarding accidents, these organizations acknowledge that many errors
remain latent, embedded within the operational system until just the right combination of
errors occur which lead to an adverse event (Roberts & Bea, 2001; Maurino, Johnston,
Reason, & Lee, 1995). Sensitivity to operations is promoted in HROs through supervisor
and management support of day to day activities. Its purpose is to set the tone in the
organization and its work units by continuously monitoring and discussing events as they
occur so as to promote patient safety. Success depends on maintaining a clear picture of
what is going on (i.e., situation awareness) and filtering this information to all levels of
the organization.
Supervisors and organization management can promote a sensitivity to operations
by supporting error detection, providing feedback to employees regarding errors, and
communicating about how these errors can be prevented in the future. Research has
indicated that management commitment to safety in manufacturing-type industries is an
indicator of a positive safety culture (e.g., Rundmo, 1994; Zohar, 1980; 2000), and its
approach to safety has been linked to a reduction in incidents in three studies. For
example, Katz-Navon, Naveh, & Stern (2005) found that management support for safety
(i.e., safety placed as a priority) moderated the relationship between safety procedures
and number of treatment errors in healthcare. Similarly, O’Toole (2002) found that upper
management's approach to safety was a significant factor in the reduction of mining and
construction injury rates. Finally, Zohar (2000) found that supervisor actions and
expectation were significant predictors of minor injuries in a metal processing plant.
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These studies suggest that how management approaches and promotes safety has a
significant effect on incidents.
Other research suggests that a positive safety culture is associated with a
commitment from upper level management that supports and encourages safety policies
and procedures. For example, Zohar (1980) found that management commitment to
safety was a major factor influencing success of safety programs in a number of industrial
factories. In 2000, Zohar also found that perceptions of positive supervisor expectations
towards safety resulted fewer lost-days due to accidents. Zacharatos, Barling and Iverson
(2005) investigated the relationship between management practices and occupational
safety. They found that the two were related and the relationship was mediated by safety
climate and trust in management. Likewise, Cox and Flin (1998) found in 13
manufacturing companies that management actions for safety was the strongest predictor
employee actions. Margolis (1973, as cited in Coyle et al., 1995) found similar results.
Forgaty and Shaw (2003) found that management attitudes and group norms were
significant predictors of violation behavior in aircraft maintenance workers. Finally,
additional research suggests that a lack of management commitment leads to lack of trust,
poor communication, and a lack in confidence in management (Cooper & Phillips, 1994
as cited in Clark, 1999; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991). These studies indicate the
importance of supervisor support in a safety culture in a number of industries, and
possibly in reducing incidents (e.g., errors).
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Hypothesis 1. Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly
related to incidents, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor expectations will
result in fewer incidents.
Hypothesis 2. Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly
related to overall perceptions of safety, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor
expectations will result in higher levels of overall perceptions of safety.
Hypothesis 3. Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly
related to patient safety grade within units, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor
expectations will result in a higher patient safety grade.
Hypothesis 4a. Hospital management support is significantly related to number of
events reported, specifically when hospital management supports patient safety a greater
number of events will be reported.
Hypothesis 4b. Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship
between hospital management support for safety and number of events reported.
Hypothesis 5a. Hospital management support is significantly related to unit
reporting rates, specifically when hospital management supports patient safety there will
be a higher ratio of events reported to patient days within units.
Hypothesis 5b. Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship
between hospital management support for safety and unit reporting rates.
Hypothesis 6. Hospital management support for safety is positively related to
overall perceptions of safety.
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Hypothesis 7. Hospital management support for safety is positively related to
patient safety grade.
Related to setting appropriate expectations regarding safety, management must
also provide feedback to employees on their safety performance. Without support from
those said to be enforcing safety, employees will have little motivation to adhere to the
safety policies and procedures. Research suggests that reinforcing positive safety
behaviors through feedback and praise may lead to improved safe practices (e.g.,
Hopkins et al., 1986; Komaki, Barwick, and Scott, 1978; Sulzer-Azaroff, Loafman,
Merante, & Hlavacek, 1990; Komanki, Collins, & Penn, 1982). For example, research
conducted by Komanki and colleagues (1980; 1982) indicates that consequent feedback
rather than antecedent feedback results in performance improvements. In addition, it was
found that feedback provided directly to employees versus their supervisors was more
effective in reducing injuries and illness (Saari & Näsänen, 1989). Similarly, Laitinen and
Ruohomaki (1996) found that providing weekly feedback regarding safety to workers at
Finnish building construction sites led to higher safety levels in the workplace. Finally,
Cooper (2006) found that management support and feedback were significantly related to
behavioral safety performance. These studies indicate that the more that employees feel
that management is committed to safety and their use of safe practices, as demonstrated
by providing feedback for example, the more likely that employees’ attitudes will
become more positive and performance will improve. However, like that of supervisor
expectations, the relationship between feedback and communication about errors to
safety and behaviors has not been made in healthcare. However, it is expected that when
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greater feedback is provided, employees will be more likely to follow safe care practices,
including reporting errors when they occur.
Hypothesis 8a. Feedback and communication about errors is positively related to
overall perceptions of safety.
Hypothesis 8b. Organizational learning partially mediates the relationship
between feedback and communication about errors and overall perceptions of patient
safety.
Hypothesis 9a. Feedback and communication about errors is positively related to
patient safety grade within units.
Hypothesis 9b. Organizational learning partially mediates the relationship
between feedback and communication about errors and patient safety grade.
Hypothesis 10. Feedback and communication about errors will be positively
correlated with supervisor expectations about patient safety.

Reluctance to Simplify
There is a desire in organizations to want to simplify a situation in order to
increase predictability and reduce complexity. HROs recognize that when simplified too
much this tact can be harmful to the organization and information may be lost. Often
when things are simplified the human in the loop tends to assume that there are limited
ways to achieve a certain goal or end state. These inflexible expectations can lead to
disconfirming or novel evidence being ignored or misinterpreted for once the cognitive
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structures containing expectations are created, they are very resistant to change. HROs
exhibit a reluctance to simplify by supporting and promoting (through management
attitudes and actions) those working at the front line (i.e., the sharp end), specifically by
promoting and encouraging interaction between people who have diverse expectations
and backgrounds (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). This interaction also helps the organization
to expect the unexpected and remain adaptive by providing different viewpoints on the
same problem or environmental cue. These interactions may include coordinating with
providers within the same department or unit (e.g., physicians with nurses) or
coordinating across units (e.g., nurses with pharmacists). HROs recognize the importance
of

effective

communication

and

coordination

strategies.

Communication

and

coordination in HROs may include coordinating within the same department (e.g.,
between nuclear power plant operators) or across departments (e.g., coordination in air
traffic control between ground controllers and local air controllers). Similarly in
healthcare, communication and coordination (i.e., teamwork) must occur not only within
units but also across units, where different policies and procedures may be in place
adding additional challenges. For example, within hospital units, patients are handed off
from one shift to the next. It is important that team members of shift A fully
communicate all critical information regarding a patient to team members of the
oncoming shift B. Teamwork is also needed across units; for example, as patients are
transferred from one unit to the next or when a procedure or medication is requested from
another department (e.g., laboratory or pharmacy, respectively). Therefore, the
importance of effectively communicating and coordinating is of the utmost importance.
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Teamwork in healthcare

HROs encourage teamwork on the front line as the first line of defense in
detecting errors (Baker, Day & Salas, 2006), and JCAHO is following suit (JCAHO,
2002). The importance of teams in healthcare is being recognized as physicians, nurses,
technicians, pharmacists and other healthcare providers must communicate, coordinate
and cooperate in an effort to ensure quality patient care (Salas, Wilson, Murphy, King &
Salisbury, in press). Each member brings his/her own expertise to the table and a proper
‘check and balance system’ encourages team members to question the actions and
decisions of each other (i.e., the “collaborative care model”; JCAHO, 2002). The purpose
of this model is to encourage decision making, problems solving, goal setting and sharing
of patient care responsibilities through teamwork behaviors such as briefing (e.g.,
surgical team briefs a procedure prior to surgery), performance monitoring and back up
behavior (e.g., a nurse recognizes that a patient is allergic to the medication a physician
has prescribed), assertiveness (e.g., a nurse calls a ‘time out’ due to a concern for patient
safety), and leadership (e.g., the resident on call sets the tone for the night shift in the
emergency department) (Wilson et al., 2005). However, failures in teamwork continue to
occur, primarily communication, and are a leading cause of patient harm (JCAHO, n.d.).
In a study by Lingard and colleagues (2004), 36.4% of communication failures in the
operating room resulted in an observable effect on patient care (e.g., inefficiency, team
tension, resource waste, care delay). In another study, Thomas, Sexton, Lasky,
Helmreich, Crandell and Tyson (2006) found correlations between teamwork behaviors
27

and perceptions of overall quality in neonatal care (e.g., resuscitation, labor and delivery).
Specifically, communication (i.e., information sharing and inquiry) and leadership (i.e.,
assertion, intentions shared, evaluation of plans and leadership) were significantly
correlated with nurses’ rating of overall quality of care. In addition, communication and
management (i.e., workload management and vigilance) were significantly correlated
with compliance with the Neonatal Resuscitation Program’s (NPR) steps for
administering care.
Also within the realm of teamwork is communication and coordination during
handoffs, an area which has been studied in a number of HRO communities. For
example, Patterson, Roth, Woods, Chow and Gomes (2004) observed 21 handoff
strategies in four high consequence domains—space shuttle mission control, nuclear
power, railroad dispatch and ambulance dispatch. A majority of strategies observed
across disciplines included improving handoff efficiency and effectiveness, increasing
access to data, improving coordination with others and enabling error detection and
recovery. Like HROs, healthcare organizations consist of a number of tightly coupled
work units (e.g., emergency room, intensive care units, surgical department), however,
healthcare organizations are more loosely coupled when referring to interactions across
units (Pinelle & Gutwin, 2006). This loose coupling makes it difficult to share
information across units and increases the likelihood of errors. For example, Flin and
colleagues (2003) found that more than 50% of operating room personnel who
participated in their study indicated that they feel uncomfortable telling team members
from other disciplines that they need to take some sort of action. Other breakdowns occur
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during handoffs between shifts within the same unit or when transitioning a patient to
another unit. A notable example of this type of breakdown occurred when a physician
failed to follow up on test results of a patient which led eventually to a misdiagnosis and
death of the patient (Gandhi, 2005). Cited was a failure of providers to clearly establish
primary responsibility for following up on such tests (i.e., diffused responsibility). In
another case, a patient, Willie King, had the incorrect leg amputated after the surgery
pool nurse failed to alert the surgery shift nurse during the handoff that the incorrect leg
was inputted by the clerk for amputation (Cook, Woods, & Miller, 1998, as cited in
Patterson et al., 2004). Gandhi et al. (2006) found that handoffs contributed to
approximately 20% of errors in ambulatory settings.
New communication techniques are being promoted by hospital management. For
example, the SBAR technique was introduced in 2004 and is being implemented in
hospitals nationwide as a means to improving communication during handoffs and
transitions (Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; Carroll, 2006). SBAR stands for
Situation (i.e., “what is going on with the patient?”), Background (i.e., “what is the
clinical background, or context?”), Assessment (i.e., “what do I think the problem is?”)
and Recommendation (i.e., “what would I do to correct it?”) (Leonard et al., 2004, p.
i86). The goal of these techniques is to improve teamwork so as to reduce the risk of
incidents.
The research described in the preceding sections supports the notion that
supervisor and management support for patient safety and frontline staff teamwork both
impact performance. However, it is unlikely that supervisor support and teamwork
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operate independently. One influences the other and research shows that this influence
starts at the top and trickles down to lower levels. However, the relationship between
supervisor and management support, teamwork and outcomes has yet to be studied. It is,
thus, argued here that teamwork will mediate the relationship between supervisor and
management support for patient safety and patient safety outcomes.
Hypothesis 11. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor
expectations and incidents.
Hypothesis 12. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor
expectations and overall perceptions of safety.
Hypothesis 13. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor
expectations and patient safety grade.
Hypothesis 14. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital
management support and incidents.
Hypothesis 15. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital
management support and overall perceptions of safety.
Hypothesis 16. Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital
management support and patient safety grade.

Preoccupation with Failure
As HROs are characterized by the minimization of error, they have fewer learning
opportunities than most organizations. However, HROs remain preoccupied with their
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failures, no matter how big or small, and even minor mishaps serve as learning
opportunities (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Rather than dismissing an error that did not
result in failure as a stroke of bad luck, they view these events as a signal that something
may be wrong in the system. HROs preoccupation with failure can be seen in the
frequency of incident reviews, the reporting of errors no matter how inconsequential, and
an obsession with the liabilities of success (e.g., complacency, temptation to reduce
safety margins). HROs combat potential liabilities of success through the recognition that
human error is inevitable and do not let their guard down. Preoccupation with failure can
be promoted by encouraging staff to report errors when they occur, and shifting from a
culture of blame to a culture of learning so that errors can be prevented in the future.

Culture of learning and error reporting

Within the healthcare community, there is a tendency “to turn medical mistakes
resulting in death into tragedies calling for criminal investigation” (Holbrook, 2003, p.
1119). Furthermore, “punishment drives reporting of errors underground, preventing the
very systems examination that is needed to discover and correct the underlying causes”
(Leape, 2000, p. 2). This fear of punishment, without a doubt, encourages providers to
cover up their mistakes. When evidence exists that negligence was involved, the
punishment must fit the crime. What about those instances when faulty systems lead to a
tragic event? When a series of inconsequential mistakes (in isolation) line up just
perfectly to create a fatal outcome—what then? Should these mistakes be punished? Who
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do we blame? After all, we know that human error is inevitable. But, humans are at the
sharp end and in general are the last line of defense in preventing (or contributing to) a
tragedy. Therefore, they are often easiest to blame and usually are.
But not all errors lead to a tragic ending, contributing to the mentality of ‘no
harm, no foul’. These errors are covered up to avoid persecution. Unfortunately, it is
likely these same errors that on another day may lead to a more severe outcome.
However, if we do not know what is broken, how can we fix it? How can we prevent
these errors from occurring? In many HROs, the likelihood of a reportable error is few
and far between. Therefore, HROs encourage the reporting of errors in which no harm
has been committed. This is accomplished through a culture of learning, one in which
employees are encouraged to learn from their mistakes, not hide them and cover them up.
HROs do not attempt to hide the fact that human error is inevitable. However, they seek
to avoid, trap, or mitigate the consequences of such errors by encouraging employees to
routinely check for errors (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). This encouragement
starts at the top levels of the organization (i.e., management) and filters down to the sharp
end. The purpose is not to place blame and point fingers when an error occurs (Hofmann
& Stetzer, 1998; Westrum, 1987, as cited in Pidgeon & O’Leary, 1994). Rather, the cause
of the error(s) is investigated (not just the outcome of the incident) and when its cause is
determined, the whole organization learns from it (Barling & Zacharatos, 1999).
In light of the above discussion, it is no surprise that most individuals do not want
to admit their mistakes. In the past, errors in healthcare have often justified and
rationalized due to the complex and subjective nature of medicine (Pietro et al., 2000). To
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further complicate the issue, healthcare providers are not obligated to report errors that do
not meet certain criteria. In a study that looked at the impact of mandatory, nonconfidential error reporting systems, it was found that these systems highly discouraged
error reporting (Weissman et al., 2005). Reasons provided for not disclosing or further
investigating errors are risk of negative publicity and legal actions, high costs, lack of
standards for what is an unacceptable error, and lack of justification to conduct such an
investigation (Pietro et al., 2000). However, in a study conducted by Carroll and
Edmondson (2002), it was found that teams who were able to openly discuss adverse
experiences that occurred in the operating room excelled at learning over teams who
faced communication barriers. Mohr, Abelson, & Barach (2002) suggest that a culture of
learning is a useful intervention for improving patient safety. In other words, in
environments where there was a fear of retribution for reporting an error (i.e., a lack of a
non-punitive culture), employees will tend not to report errors that aren’t deemed
‘reportable’ (e.g., where patient harm occurred), therefore resulting in lost data points
from which to learn. Given what we know regarding the influence of upper level
management, it is expected that hospital management support for patient safety initiatives
would be highly related to whether or not a non-punitive culture is in place.
To overcome these barriers, one HRO community (i.e., aviation) has encouraged
a culture of learning by utilizing an anonymous, voluntary reporting system. The
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was developed by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) for the aviation community, allowing general and
commercial aviation pilots and/or crewmembers to report errors and unsafe acts that
33

occurred during a flight without providing discernible information about themselves. The
aviation industry has been extremely successful since its inception and receives more
than 32,000 reports each year (Orlady & Orlady, 1999). The data collected from ASRS
has allowed the aviation community to react to errors proactively by incorporating critical
incidents that occur frequently into training (Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). The
data is not only useful for training purposes, but it is also provides an awareness to other
aviation professionals via publication in periodicals and the Internet. The success of
ASRS has led to the development of similar systems in other organizations, for example
the healthcare, nuclear and petrochemical domains (e.g., Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson,
1999; Helmreich, 2000). This is encouraging given the high number of errors that occur
each year, especially in healthcare.
Hypothesis 17. Hospital management support for safety is positively correlated
with a non-punitive response to error.
Hypothesis 18a. A non-punitive response to errors will be significantly related to
number of events reported, specifically when a non-punitive culture is in place employees
will report more events they observe.
Hypothesis 18b. Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship
between a non-punitive response to errors and number of events reported.
Hypothesis 19a. A non-punitive culture will be significantly related to unit
reporting rates, specifically when a non-punitive culture is in place there will be a higher
ratio of events to patient days within units.
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Hypothesis 19b. Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship
between a non-punitive response to errors and unit reporting rates.

Commitment to Resilience
Most organizations focus almost to exclusion on anticipating unexpected events.
While HROs anticipate where possible, they also recognize that within complex
environments the ability to perfectly predict the unexpected is almost impossible due to
weak signals and uncertain environments (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Therefore, in
addition to anticipation HROs promote a commitment to resilience or the ability to
recover from errors. Whereas anticipation seeks to perfectly predict and therefore avoid
unexpected events, resilience is concerned with containing or managing those unexpected
events that have already happened.
Building off the work of Wildavsky, resilience has been defined as being
“mindful about errors that have already occurred and to correct them before they worsen
and cause more serious harm” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 67). While the concept of
resilience admits to the fact that organizations may have to play ‘catch up’, a strategy
which balances anticipation with resilience is safer than one that relies on anticipation
alone. Specifically, it has been argued that an organizational strategy which commits
solely to anticipation is dangerous within complex environments for it presumes a level
of understanding that is impossible to obtain and provides a false sense of security
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Commitment to resilience can be promoted in healthcare
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through management support for patient safety (e.g., appropriate resources, such as
adequate staffing) and the development of a learning culture (see above discussion). As a
discussion of the importance of a learning culture has already been discussed, here a
discussion of the importance of adequate resources, specifically staffing, in HROs is
provided.

Staffing

Staffing in organizations, especially healthcare, is of the utmost importance. After
all, it is the front line staff that has direct contact with the patient. Furthermore, staff
members are the last line of defense in mitigating errors that can lead to adverse
consequences. The research examining staffing and safety culture has studied the
relationship from a number of perspectives. While some have looked at characteristics of
the staff, including age, tenure and staff position, others have looked at staffing levels.
For example, Castle and colleagues (2006; 2007) found that nursing homes with higher
levels reported higher safety culture scores. Staffing can be measured in terms of
adequate staff members to handle workload, minimize amount of overtime required, and
limited temporary staff.
Hypothesis 20. Staff turnover will be correlated with perceptions of staffing,
overall perceptions of safety and patient safety grade.
Hypothesis 21. Staffing will partially mediate the relationship between hospital
management support for safety and overall perceptions of safety.
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Deference to Expertise
The last characteristic that enables HROs to contain, as well as identify, the
unexpected is a deference to expertise. Within the predominant number of mainstream
organizations, authority is closely tied to organizational hierarchy and rank. HROs are not
bound by this norm. HROs teach members to value expertise wherever it might lie, as
well as training organizational members to recognize expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2001). This enables the organization to use and recombine its resources (i.e., personnel
and knowledge) in the most efficient manner possible. Organizations can foster a
deference to expertise by encouraging openness of communication between all levels of
the organization. As it may not always be senior team members (e.g., surgeon) who have
the most expertise in a given situation, it is important for less senior members (e.g.,
nurse) to feel comfortable speaking up and offering their expertise. Along the same line,
members within HROs share common goals (e.g., patient safety) and therefore are more
willing to provide and receive feedback to meet these goals. Therefore, HROs encourage
team members to speak up (i.e., assert themselves by clearly, directly, and respectfully
communicating their concerns, ideas, etc.) when an error has been detected regardless of
who committed the error.

Communication openness and errors

Within the aviation community, a lack of communication openness (or
assertiveness) among crew members has led to a number of accidents. A review by the
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National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of 37 major air carrier accidents revealed
that in more than 80% of the accidents, the first officer failed to adequately monitor
and/or challenge actions taken by the captain (NTSB, 1994). Had the first officer done so,
it is possible that these accidents could have been prevented. Assertiveness training has
proven successful among team members within the aviation community, which has
shown to reduce the risk of errors (Jentsch, 1997; Smith-Jentsch, Jentsch, Payne & Salas,
1996). Assertiveness has also been deemed a critical skill for crew resource management
(CRM) and management is supporting assertiveness by its incorporation into a number of
training programs (see Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman & Howse, 2006). In a study
conducted by Orasanu and colleagues (1999), it was found that pilots differentiate
between situations that relate to safety and those that do not. In situations in which the
safety of the flight is in jeopardy, all pilots (regardless of position) will assert themselves.
When non-safety related issues are at hand (e.g., CRM issues), crew member position
does play a role. Specifically, first officers and flight engineers (i.e., junior positions)
recognize that in these situations it may not be appropriate to intervene. Captains, on the
other hand, are more likely to intervene regardless of the issue.
While deference to expertise is one area in which the healthcare domain has
struggled due to its strict hierarchy and professional culture, it is nevertheless critical for
patient safety and must be promoted from the top down. In 1967, Stein (as cited in
Zwarentstein & Reeves, 2002) outlined the ‘rules’ of the ‘doctor-nurse game’.
Specifically, it was stated that the physicians (i.e., the ‘dominant male’) are responsible
for issues surrounding diagnosing, operating, and prescribing patient care, whereas nurses
38

(i.e., females) are responsible for less clinical tasks such as housekeeping and patient
service. While many doctors and nurses used to assume the aforementioned roles, much
has changed in healthcare. Almost 25 years later, Stein and colleagues (1990) wrote a
follow up to his original article in which it was found there has been somewhat of an
equalization of the sexes and professions, where nurses and physicians have more open
lines of communication. Although there has been significant improvements, the research
continues to indicate that barriers do exist. For example, research by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has indicated that approximately 60% of
healthcare workers agree that communication openness exists in their hospitals (AHRQ,
2007). This indicates that a significant number of employees (40%) still feel
uncomfortable speaking up to those of more authority. Despite this, assertiveness among
the ranks has been deemed critical in the operating room, especially for anesthetists (e.g.,
Greaves & Grant, 2000; Fletcher, Flin, McGeorge, Glavin, Maran, & Patey, 2003; Flin,
Fletcher, McGeorge, Sutherland, & Patey, 2003). In a study by Flin et al. (2003), only 6%
of participants believed that junior team members should not question decisions of senior
personnel in the operating room. While the research on assertiveness in healthcare has
primarily focused on the operating room, the importance of assertiveness should not stop
there—it is important in all units, especially when patient safety is threatened.
Supervisors and management must encourage providers to speak up in a polite yet
persistent manner, rather than hint and hope, until their concern is heard (Leonard et al.,
2004). This support will in turn lead to greater openness among the ranks and reduce the
risk of incidents. In sum, deference to expertise allows teams within HROs to take full
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advantage of the potential synergy available within the team in any given situation,
regardless of rank, in order to reduce the risk of incidents and improve patient care.
Hypothesis 22. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship
between supervisor expectations and incidents.
Hypothesis 23. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship
between supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety.
Hypothesis 24. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship
between supervisor expectations and patient safety grade.
Hypothesis 25. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship
between hospital management support and incidents.
Hypothesis 26. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship
between hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety.
Hypothesis 27. Communication openness partially mediates the relationship
between hospital management support and patient safety grade.

Summary
While the above discussion focuses on safety culture across all industries, a closer
look will be taken to understand patient safety culture in healthcare. A majority of the
literature found has focused on predictors of safety culture or has looked at safety culture
in general as a mediator between management actions and safe practices. For example,
higher levels of teamwork (Rudman et al., 2006), units with higher levels of registered
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nurses on staff (Castle, 2006), greater situation awareness (Galvan, Bacha, Mohr, &
Barach, 2005), and greater exposure to risk (Lymer, Richt & Isaksson, 2004) leads to
more positive safety cultures in healthcare organizations. Few articles were found that
examined the impact of safety culture on patient safety outcomes. For example, it was
found that overall safety climate is significantly related to medication errors.
Within other industries beyond healthcare, research suggests that safety culture is
related to an organizations’ safety level (e.g., Zohar, 1980; Diaz & Cabrera, 1997). This
research suggests that a positive safety climate improves worker attitudes which leads to
a motivation to perform safe behaviors and ultimately safety in the organization.
Additionally, it has been found that management commitment to safety greatly influences
the success of a safety program (e.g., DePasquale & Geller, 1999; Smith, Cohen, Cohen,
and Cleveland, 1978). For example, employees’ perceptions of management’s
commitment to safety (e.g., support of training) have resulted in fewer injuries on the job
(e.g., Zohar, 2000). Another significant finding indicates the benefits of employee
involvement in safety practices (e.g., training; DePasquale and Geller, 1999). Employee
involvement was shown to lead to greater trust within the organization between
management and coworkers. Finally, research suggests that compliance with safety
policies and procedures is influenced by employee knowledge and motivation (Neal,
Griffin, and Hart, 2000), enforcement (Halter & Drury, 2002), and possibly adherence by
other employees (Hong, Kim, Kritkausky, and Rahid, 1998).
The research available in the literature is useful in that it informs us that safety
culture is important in organizations and we understand what influences it. However,
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many of these studies focus on safety culture or climate in general rather than examining
which factors of safety culture or climate impacted those outcomes. This dissertation
seeks to address this issue by gathering data by diagnosing perceptions of safety culture
along multiple dimensions and examining the impact of these perceptions on patient
safety outcomes.
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SECTION 3 - METHOD
Materials and Measures

AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture
The data used as a part of this research was a part of a previously administered
safety culture survey, specifically the AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety
(HSOPS). The HSOPS survey consists of 44 items related to 14 dimensions within a
hospital (see APPENDIX B: HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY). The 14
dimensions are further categorized as relating to safety culture dimensions at the unit
level, safety culture dimensions at the hospital level, and safety culture outcomes.
Previous testing of the AHRQ survey indicated good psychometric properties. Cronbach
alpha for each of the dimensions ranged from .63 to .84.
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with
each item. Responses were on a 5-point Likert scale from strongly agree (5) to strongly
disagree (1), or always (5) to never (1), depending on the dimension. In addition, there
were two single-item questions on the scale asking participants to report the number of
events they have reported in the last 12 months and to give their work unit an overall
patient safety grade (A-F). A majority of the survey was unit based, such that respondents
completed the survey with respect to their experiences in a particular unit or patient care
area. Several items asked participants to focus on the hospital as a whole. The survey also
collected data related to hospital campus, primary work area/unit, and staff position, as
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well as demographic items (e.g., age, sex). The HSOPS thus provided feedback grouped
at a variety of levels, including hospital, unit, and staff position. The time to complete the
survey was approximately 10-15 minutes.

Reliability Analysis
Reliability of the HSOPS was assessed by running internal consistency tests on
the 44 items to determine the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for each of the 14 dimensions.
Likewise of previous studies demonstrating the reliability of the scale, moderate to high
alpha coefficients were found (see Table 5). Given this, items were collapsed into their
respective dimensions and mean scores were calculated for each of the 14 dimensions for
each participant.

Dependent Variables
Patient safety grade

This variable is measured as a part of the AHRQ HSOPS. It is a one item question
in which participants were asked to “Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an
overall grade on patient safety”. Response choices ranged from a grade of A to F.
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Overall perceptions of safety

This variable is also measures as a part of the AHRQ HSOPS. It is calculated
based on the mean responses to a set of four items—(1) Patient safety is never sacrificed
to get more work done, (2) Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors
from happening, (3) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around
here (reverse worded) and (4) We have patient safety problems in this unit (reverse
worded). Participants were asked to respond to these statements on a 5-point Likert scale
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). A mean closer to five indicates
more positive perceptions of safety in a particular unit.

Number of events reported

Number of events reported is a third outcome measure collected using the AHRQ
HSPOS. It is a one item question asking participants to indicate the number of events that
they have reported in their unit over the last 12 months. Response choices were none, one
to two, three to five, six to 10, 11 to 20, and 21 or more.

Unit reporting rates

Unit reporting rates were collected independent of the HSOPS by the hospital’s
Risk Management department. Unit reporting rates were calculated based on the number
of events reported per patient days in a particular unit over a period of 12 months.
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Incidents

Incidents were also collected independent of the HSOPS by the hospital’s Risk
Management department and categorized by the type of incident that occurred. An event
is considered an incident if it meets the federal and state regulations for reporting (i.e.,
unexpected occurrence of or risk thereof death or serious physical or psychological injury
to a patient). Incident data was collected by each unit over a 12 month period.

Staff turnover

Staff turnover data was collected by the hospital, independent of the patient safety
survey administered as a part of this research. Staff turnover is based on the number of
staff who separated or were acquired by a unit. Staff turnover is presented as a percentage
of the separation (or accession) number divided by the total number of staff in that unit.
This data was gathered over a 12 month period.
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Table 5
Safety culture dimensions measured by HSOPS survey, associated survey items and reliabilities.
Supervisor
Expectations
about Safety
α= .77
My supervisor/
manager says a good
word when he/she
sees a job done
according to
established patient
safety procedures.
My supervisor/
manager seriously
considers staff
suggestions for
improving patient
safety.
Whenever pressure
builds up, my
supervisor/ manager
wants us to work
faster, even if it
means taking
shortcuts. (r)
My supervisor/
manager overlooks
patient safety
problems that happen
over and over. (r)

Organizational
Learning
α= .67
We are actively
doing things to
improve patient
safety.

Safety Culture Dimensions (Unit Level)
Communication
Teamwork
Feedback and
Openness
Within Hospital
Communication
Units
about Error
α= .73
α= .79
α= .74
Staff will freely
People support one We are given
speak up if they see another in this unit. feedback about
something that may
changes put into
negatively affect
place based on
patient care.
event reports.

Mistakes have led
to positive changes
here.

Staff feel free to
question the
decisions or actions
of those with more
authority.

After we make
changes to improve
patient safety, we
evaluate their
effectiveness.

Staff are afraid to
ask questions when
something does not
seem right. (r)

When a lot of work
needs to be done
quickly, we work
together as a team
to get the work
done.
In this unit, people
treat each other
with respect.

When one area in
this unit gets really
busy, others help
out.
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Non-punitive
Response To
Error
α= .76
Staff feel like their
mistakes are held
against them. (r)

Staffing
α= .63
We have enough
staff to handle the
workload.

We are informed
about errors that
happen in this unit.

When an event is
reported, it feels
like the person is
being written up,
not the problem. (r)

Staff in this unit
work longer hours
than is best for
patient care. (r)

In this unit, we
discuss ways to
prevent errors from
happening again.

Staff worry that
mistakes they make
are kept in their
personnel file. (r)

We use more
agency/ temporary
staff than is best for
patient care. (r)

We work in “crisis
mode”, trying to do
too much, too
quickly. (r)

Teamwork Across Hospital Units
α= .78
There is good cooperation among hospital
units that need to work together.
Hospital units work well together to provide
the best care for patients.
Hospital units do not coordinate well with each
other. (r)

Safety Culture Dimensions (Hospital Level)
Hospital Management Support for Patient
Safety
α= .78
Hospital management provides a work climate
that promotes patient safety.
The actions of hospital management show that
patient safety is a top priority.
Hospital management seems interested in
patient safety only after an adverse event
happens. (r)

It is often unpleasant to work with staff from
other hospital units. (r)
Patient Safety Grade
Single item response
Please give your work area/unit in
this hospital an overall grade on
patient safety.

Hospital Handoffs & Transitions
α= .80
Things “fall between the cracks” when
transferring patients from one unit to another.
(r)
Important patient care information is often lost
during shift changes. (r)
Problems often occur in the exchange of
information across hospital units. (r)
Shift changes are problematic for patients in
this hospital. (r)

Outcome Measures
Overall Perceptions of Safety
Frequency of Event Reporting
α= .77
α= .85
Patient safety is never sacrificed
When a mistake is made, but is
to get more work done.
caught and corrected before
affecting the patient, how often is
it reported?
Our procedures and systems are
When a mistake is made that
good at preventing errors from
could harm the patient, how often
happening.
is it reported?
It is just by chance that more
When a mistake is made that
serious mistakes don’t happen
could harm the patient, but does
around here. (r)
not, how often is it reported?
We have patient safety problems
in this unit. (r)

Note: r = item is reverse worded
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Number of Events Reported
Single item response
In the past 12 months, how many
event reports have you filled out
and submitted?

Procedure
The survey was distributed through an online link available via an email sent to
all hospital employees as well as the hospital’s intranet in June 5-July 9, 2006 (see
APPENDIX B: HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY). In addition, English
and Spanish paper-based surveys were made available to employees not wishing to
complete the survey online. Participants were informed that responses were anonymous.
A waiver of informed consent and HIPAA authorization was granted through Florida
Hospital’s and UCF’s Institutional Review Boards. All employees were invited to
participate in the survey; however, for the purposes of this study, only critical areas in the
hospital were examined. Completed survey data was sent to the author as a consultant
hired by the hospital, who also completed subsequent data analyses for the hospital.
Incidents (i.e., categorized by type of incident) and unit reporting rates (i.e., number of
events reported per patient days in unit) were gathered independently of the survey data
over a one year time period—January 2006 – December 2006. This study was approved
by the UCF Institutional Review Board (APPENDIX C: UCF INSTITIONAL REVIEW
BOARD APPROVAL LETTER).

Power Analysis
A power analysis was done to determine the minimum number of sites and
participants within sites needed to find desired effects sizes. The conventional power
level of .80 and alpha level of .05 were used. Raudenbush and Liu (2000) was used to
gauge appropriate effect size for this study, who suggest 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 as small,
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medium and large effect sizes, respectively. Selecting a medium effect size, it is
suggested that 20 sites with 20 participants in each site be used to gain sufficient power.
Theoretically, the 5 (units) x 7 (campus) nature of the design led to the potential that 35
unit by location sites would be available, well above that as recommended by
Raudenbush and Liu (2000). However, given the fact that not all units are located at each
site, this number of groups used in this study is slightly smaller. In addition, sites with
less than 20 participants were excluded from the data analysis. Twenty-three sites were
thus included in this study (see Table 6).

Table 6
List of sites (location and unit type) included in research and number of participants at
each site
Site ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Location
Altamonte
Altamonte
Altamonte
Altamonte
Apopka
Celebration
Celebration
Celebration
Celebration
East Orlando
East Orlando
East Orlando
East Orlando
Kissimmee
Orlando
Orlando
Orlando
Orlando
Orlando
Winter Park
Winter Park
Winter Park
Winter Park

Unit Type
Intensive Care Unit
Emergency Department
Perinatal
Surgery
Emergency Department
Intensive Care Unit
Emergency Department
Perinatal
Surgery
Intensive Care Unit
Emergency Department
Surgery
Pediatrics
Emergency Department
Intensive Care Unit
Emergency Department
Perinatal
Surgery
Pediatrics
Emergency Department
Perinatal
Surgery
Pediatrics
Total:
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N
23
66
24
55
51
30
56
28
26
34
114
38
27
38
174
93
38
149
250
44
41
34
28
1461

Respondent Characteristics
Survey respondents are 1461 employees of a large central Florida hospital. The
average response rate for all hospital employees was approximately 35%. This is a
significant improvement over 11% collected in 2005, indicating that participants are more
willing to provide feedback to the hospital. Respondents range in age from 17 to 70 with
a mean age of 40 years. Furthermore, 61.9% of respondents were registered nurses and
82.5% female. The respondents come from 23 units located at seven hospital campuses
located across central Florida. Responses per unit by campus ranged in size from 23 to
250 staff with an average response of 64 members per unit. The staff positions of
participants include registered nurses (N= 903), physician assistants/nurse practitioners
(N= 19), LVN/LPN (N= 29), patient care assistant/health aide/care partner (N= 101),
attending/staff physician (N= 42), pharmacist (N= 3), dietician (N= 4), unit
assistant/clerk

secretary

physical/occupational/speech

(N=

86),

therapist

(N=

respiratory
4),

therapist

technician

(N=

(N=
34),

33),
and

administration/management (N= 52). In addition, 148 participants marked the “other”
category or did not specify their staff position.
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SECTION 4 - RESULTS
Data Analysis
All analyses were performed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) for Windows version 12.0. Unless otherwise noted, an alpha level of .05 will be
used in all analyses. Data were screened for normality and outliers prior to analysis. To
test the hypotheses, a mixed model approach was used and variables of interest were
entered in as either factors or covariates, fixed or random, depending on the data.

Description of Analysis Strategy: Hierarchical Linear Modeling
Life dictates that individuals are embedded within groups which are embedded in
organizations. In healthcare settings, the hierarchical structure exists such that individuals
are nested within units which are nested in hospitals. And lower levels are influenced by
factors at higher levels. Conventional statistics (e.g., ordinary least square), however,
often fail to address the nested structure adequately (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) by
aggregating lower level data to a higher level or disaggregating higher level data to a
lower level (Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000). On the other hand, hierarchical linear
modeling (HLM) takes the nested structure into account and offers a more powerful
statistical method to study the impact of attitudes and perceptions towards safety of
individuals nested within units nested within hospitals on clinical outcomes by taking into
consideration the within group variance. HLM is also a useful technique when size is not
equal across groups, which is to be expected in field-based studies.
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All hypotheses predicting direct and mediating relationships were tested with
HLM with the exception of those predicting a relationship with the group level variables
incidents, unit reporting rates, and staff turnover (i.e., H1, H5a-5b, H11, H14, H19a-19b,
H20-22, and H25) and those predicting correlations (i.e., H10, H17 and H20). Mediating
relationships were tested using the method suggested by Baron & Kenny (1986). To
demonstrate a mediating relationship, the following steps must be established: (a) a
significant relationship between the predictor and criterion variables, (b) a significant
relationship between the mediating variable and both the predictor and criterion variables,
and (c) a reduction of the relationship between the predictor and criterion variables, such
that the relationship is less (partial mediation) or no longer (complete mediation)
significant when the mediator is included (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
For the data collected, individuals are nested within units which are nested in
hospital campus. A fourth variable was created that combined unit and location data to a
single site ID to allow the data to be analyzed at just two levels (see Table 6). In sum, the
relationship between safety attitudes and patient safety outcomes was calculated at two
levels—Level 1: individual perceptions of patient safety and Level 2: site ID (unit type
by campus). Results presented next are organized around the dependent variable tested.
Table 7 provides an overview of hypotheses tested and if support was found or not.
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Table 7
Overview of hypotheses tested
Hyp 3
Hyp 7
Hyp 9a
Hyp 9b
Hyp 13
Hyp 16
Hyp 24
Hyp 27
Hyp 2
Hyp 6
Hyp 8a
Hyp 8b

Prediction
Patient Safety Grade
Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly related to patient
safety grade within units, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor
expectations will result in a higher patient safety grade.
Hospital management support for safety is positively related to patient safety
grade.
Feedback and communication about errors is positively related to patient safety
grade within units.
Organizational learning partially mediates the relationship between feedback and
communication about errors and patient safety grade.
Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor expectations and
patient safety grade.
Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital management
support and patient safety grade.

Supported

Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between supervisor
expectations and patient safety grade.
Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between hospital
management support and patient safety grade.
Overall Perceptions of Safety
Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly related to overall
perceptions of safety, specifically positive perceptions of supervisor expectations
will result in higher levels of overall perceptions of safety.
Hospital management support for safety is positively related to overall perceptions
of safety.
Feedback and communication about errors is positively related to overall
perceptions of safety.
Organizational learning partially mediates the relationship between feedback and
communication about errors and overall perceptions of patient safety.

√
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√

F (1,1420) = 86.41, p < .001

√

F (1,1419) = 201.76, p < .001

√

F (1,1414) = 485.79, p < .001

√

Feedback: F(1,962)=32.64, p < .001;
Org learning: F(1,963)=25.36, p < .001
Sup expect: F(1,960)=22.30, p < .001;
Teamwork: F(1, 959)=30.90, p < .001
Hosp mgmt: F (1,960) = 48.14, p < .001;
Tmwk across: F(1,955)=12.35, p < .001;
Tmwk within: F (1,958) = 31.79, p < .001
Sup expect: F(1,957)=19.85, p < .001;
Comm: F(1,954)=11.44, p < .01
Hosp mgmt: F(1,960)=48.14, p < .001;
Comm: F(1,959)=18.32, p < .001

√
√

√
√

F(1,1425)=60.99, p<.01

√

F (1,1426) = 413.22, p < .001

√

F (1,1439) = 411.72, p < .001

√

Feedback: F(1,962)=15.18, p < .001;
Org learning: F(1,961)=60.84, p < .001

Hyp 12
Hyp 15
Hyp 21
Hyp 23
Hyp 26
Hyp 4a
Hyp 4b
Hyp 18a
Hyp 18b
Hyp 5a
Hyp 5b

Prediction
Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor expectations and
overall perceptions of safety.
Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital management
support and overall perceptions of safety.

Supported
X

Staffing will partially mediate the relationship between hospital management
support for safety and overall perceptions of safety.
Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between supervisor
expectations and overall perceptions of safety.
Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between hospital
management support and overall perceptions of safety.
Number of Events Reported
Hospital management support is significantly related to number of events reported,
specifically when hospital management supports patient safety a greater number of
events will be reported.
Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship between hospital
management support for safety and number of events reported.
A non-punitive response to errors will be significantly related to number of events
reported, specifically when a non-punitive culture is in place employees will report
more events they observe.
Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship between a nonpunitive response to errors and number of events reported.
Unit Reporting Rates
Hospital management support is significantly related to unit reporting rates,
specifically when hospital management supports patient safety there will be a
higher ratio of events reported to patient days within units.
Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship between hospital
management support for safety and unit reporting rates.

√
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partial

√
√

Sup expect: F(1,958)=10.26, p < .01;
Teamwork: F(1,959)=3.44, p = .064
Hosp mgmt: F (1,956) = 71.65, p < .001;
Tmwk across: F(1,960)=14.08, p < .001;
Tmwk within: F (1,960) = 2.78, p = .10
Hosp mgmt: F(1,981)=71.93, p < .001;
Staffing: F (1,911) = 131.21, p < .001
Sup expect: F(1,956)=8.80, p < .01;
Comm: F(1,952)=4.76, p < .05
Hosp mgmt: F(1,958)=70.24, p < .001;
Comm: F(1,959) = 7.01, p < .01

√

F (1,1368) = 22.52, p < .001

partial

F (1,738) = .278, p = .598

X

F (1,1347) = .044, p = .833

X

Not tested

√

R2 = .016, β = .045, F(2,1343)=10.71,
p < .001

√

Hosp mgmt: β = .076, p < .05;
Willingness: β = .095, p < .01;
R2= .020, F(2,909)=9.42, p < .001

Hyp 19a
Hyp 19b

Hyp 1
Hyp 11
Hyp 14
Hyp 22
Hyp 25
Hyp 20

Hyp 10
Hyp 17

Prediction
A non-punitive culture will be significantly related to unit reporting rates,
specifically when a non-punitive culture is in place there will be a higher ratio of
events to patient days within units.
Willingness to report events partially mediates the relationship between a nonpunitive response to errors and unit reporting rates.
Incidents
Supervisor expectations about patient safety are significantly related to incidents,
specifically positive perceptions of supervisor expectations will result in fewer
incidents.
Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between supervisor expectations and
incidents.
Teamwork partially mediates the relationship between hospital management
support and incidents.
Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between supervisor
expectations and incidents.
Communication openness partially mediates the relationship between hospital
management support and incidents.
Staff Turnover
Staff turnover will be correlated with perceptions of staffing, overall perceptions
of safety and patient safety grade.
Correlations
Feedback and communication about errors will be positively correlated with
supervisor expectations about patient safety.
Hospital management support for safety is positively correlated with a nonpunitive response to error.
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Supported
√

R2 = .016, F (2,1343) = 10.71, p < .001

√

Non-punitive: β= .127, p < .001;
Willingness: β= .084, p < .05;
R2= .030, F(2,908)=13.98, p < .001

X

F(2,1437) = 2.05, p = .129

partial

F(2,1437) = 2.05, p = .129

X

Not tested

X

Not tested

X

Not tested

partial

Staffing: r = -.044
Overall perceptions: r = -.080, p < .01
PS grade: r = -.048

√

r = .526, p < .01

√

r = .366, p < .01

Table 8 lists the means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for the 11 safety culture
dimensions and eight outcome variables. Hypotheses 10, 17, and 20 predicted correlations
between variables. Specifically, Hypothesis 10 stated that feedback and communication about
errors would be positively correlated with supervisor expectations about patient safety. This
hypothesis was supported at both the individual and group level, .526 and .697, p < .01,
respectively. Likewise, Hypothesis 17 stated that hospital management support would be
positively correlated with a non-punitive response to errors. This hypothesis was supported at
both the individual and group level, .366 and .686, p < .01, respectively. Finally, Hypothesis 20
predicted negative correlations between staff turnover and staffing, overall perceptions of safety
and patient safety grade. Support, however, was not found between staff turnover and staffing or
patient safety grade (at the individual or group levels). A negative relationship was found,
however, between staff turnover and overall perceptions of safety at the individual level (r= .080, p < .01), but not at the group level.
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Table 8
Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for safety culture dimensions and outcome variables.
Dimension
Mean
SD
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
3.97
.75
—
1. Teamwork within units
3.72
.68
.485** —
2. Organizational learning
3. Non-punitive response to errors
2.95
.86
.349** .377** —
.77
.452** .542** .418** —
4. Supervisor expectations about safety 3.89
5. Feedback and communication about
3.56
.82
.364** .512** .328** .526** —
errors
6. Communication openness
3.58
.80
.443** .474** .456** .545** .571**
3.61
1.00 .246** .349** .316** .342** .488**
7. Willingness to report errors
8. Hospital management support for
3.54
.85
.346** .525** .366** .517** .516**
safety
3.27
.79
.365** .365** .332** .367** .406**
9. Teamwork across units
10. Handoffs and transitions
3.14
.85
.334** .315** .365** .374** .362**
11. Staffing
3.24
.82
.356** .328** .423** .405** .265**
12. Overall perceptions of safety
3.37
.86
.438** .547** .442** .516** .489**
13. PS grade
3.69
.91
.491** .530** .402** .540** .530**
14. Number of events reported
1.89
1.10 .024
-.028** .002
-.008
-.112**
(individual)
294.44 205.71 .050
.031
-.027
.038
-.036
15. Number of events reported (unit)
**
**
**
16. Medication events
131.12 146.52 .139
.078
.012
.099
-.016
**
**
**
163.32 103.96 -.097
-.049
-.07
-.065
-.048
17. Non-medication events
**
**
18. Unit reporting rates
1.48
1.33 .028
.090
.096
.050
.055*
19. Staff turnover
.067
.108 .035
-.021
.012
.024
-.026
*
**
p < 0.05 (2-tailed). p < 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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6.

7.

8.

—
.417
.455**

—
.360**

—

.372**
.361**
.340**
.485**
.487**
.005

.250**
.287**
.277**
.432**
.451**
.023

.562**
.463**
.440**
.630**
.600**
-.108**

.029
.069**
-.042
.067*
.018

.028
.068*
-.047
.124**
-.046

-.009
.044
-.081**
.116**
-.030

Dimension
9.
1. Teamwork within units
2. Organizational learning
3. Non-punitive response to
errors
4. Supervisor expectations about
safety
5. Feedback and communication
about errors
6. Communication openness
7. Willingness to report errors
8. Hospital management support
for safety
9. Teamwork across units
—
10. Handoffs and transitions
.647**
11. Staffing
.352**
12. Overall perceptions of safety
.490**
.474**
13. PS grade
14. Number of events reported
-.110**
(individual)
15. Number of events reported
.028
(unit)
16. Medication events
.085**
17. Non-medication events
-.066*
18. Unit reporting rates
.179**
19. Staff turnover
-.010
*
**
p < 0.05 (2-tailed). p < 0.01 level (2-tailed).

10.

11.

12.

13.

—
.392**
.464**
.434**
-.148**

—
.583**
.480**
.008

—
.697**
-.105**

—
-.085**

—

.002

.177**

0.045

0.04

.012

—

.062*
-.085**
.133**
.003

.273**
-.036
.126**
-.044

.138**
-.106**
.174**
-.080**

.119**
-.091**
.163**
-.048

.022
-.009
.077**
.013

.879**
.740**
-.064*
.061*
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14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

—
.330**
-.002
.369**

—
-.124**
.236**

—
.397**

DV: Overall Perceptions of Safety
Hypotheses 2, 6, 8a, 8b, 12, 15, 21, 23 and 26 predicted relationships involving
the dependent variable ‘overall perceptions of safety’. These analyses were conducted at
the individual level using HLM.

Supervisor Expectations about Safety and Overall Perceptions of Safety
Hypothesis 2 stated that supervisor expectations about patient safety would be
significantly and positively related to overall perceptions of safety (see Table 9). As
hypothesized, HLM analysis revealed a significant relationship, when controlling for
hospital management support and feedback and communication about errors, F (1,1425)
= 60.99, p < .01. Specifically, in units with higher levels of supervisor expectations
regarding safety, individuals within those units had higher perceptions of safety.

Table 9
HLM analysis of supervisor expectations about patient safety and overall perceptions of
safety
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
1
Supervisor expectations
Overall
.21
.03
7.81*** 1,1425
about patient safety
perceptions of
Hospital management
safety
.41
.02 17.26*** 1,1421
support
Feedback and
.16
.02
6.64*** 1,1423
communication
*
**
p < .05, p < .01, ***p < .001
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With support found for the positive relationship between supervisor expectations
and overall perceptions of safety (Hyp 2), hypotheses 12 and 23 predict partial mediation
of this relationship. First, Hypothesis 12 stated that teamwork partially mediates the
relationship between supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety (see Table
10). The relationship between supervisor expectations and teamwork, using hospital
management support as a covariate, also indicated a positive relationship, F (1,1434) =
40.70, p < .001. Additional support was also found for the relationship between
teamwork within units and overall perceptions of safety, F (1,963) = 4.36, p < .05.
Finally, although the previous relationships were significant, the mediation predicted in
the hypothesis is not supported (supervisor expectations: F (1,958) = 10.26, p < .01;
teamwork within units: F (1,959) = 3.44, p = .064).
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Table 10
HLM analysis predicting teamwork within units as a mediating variable between
supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
1
Supervisor expectations
Overall
.21
.03
7.81***
about patient safety
perceptions of
Hospital management
safety
.41
.02 17.26***
support
6.64***
Feedback and
.16
.02
communication
2
Supervisor expectations
Teamwork within
.35
.03 13.22***
Hospital management
units
6.38***
support
.15
.02
3
Teamwork within units
Overall
.07
.03
2.087*
Willingness to report errors perceptions of
.14
.02
6.27***
Staffing
safety
.37
.03 13.69***
Communication openness
.12
.03
3.95***
Organizational learning
.33
.04
9.01***
4
Supervisor expectations
Overall
.11
.03
3.20**
Teamwork within units
perceptions of
.06
.03
1.85
Willingness to report errors safety
.13
.02
6.10***
Staffing
.36
.03 13.07***
Communication openness
2.79**
.09
.03
Organizational learning
7.65***
.29
.04
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

df
1,1425
1,1421
1,1423
1,1435
1,1434
1,963
1,963
1,893
1,959
1,964
1,958
1,959
1,959
1,903
1,952
1,960

As previously discussed, Hypothesis 2 was supported (supervisor expectations are
positively related to overall perceptions of safety). Hypothesis 23 stated that
communication openness will partially mediate this relationship (see Table 11). The
direct relationship between supervisor expectations and communication openness was
tested first. Using hospital management support as a covariate, results showed that
supervisor expectations is positively related to communication openness, F (1,1285) =
279.78, p < .001. Next, HLM analysis also revealed a positive relationship between
communication openness and overall perceptions of safety when using covariates, F
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(1,960) = 10.79, p < .01. Finally, as predicted, a partially mediating relationship was
found (supervisor expectations: F (1,956) = 8.80, p < .01; communication openness: F
(1,952) = 4.76, p < .05).

Table 11
HLM analysis predicting communication openness as a mediating variable between
supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety.
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
1
Supervisor expectations
Overall
.21
.03 7.81*** 1,1425
about patient safety
perceptions of
Hospital management
safety
.41
.02 17.26*** 1,1421
support
Feedback and
.16
.02 6.64*** 1,1423
communication
2
Supervisor expectations
Communication
.44
.03 16.73*** 1,1285
Hospital management
openness
support
.22
.02 9.17*** 1,1342
3
Communication openness
Overall
.09
.03 3.00** 1,957
Teamwork within units
perceptions of
.04
.03 1.17
1,960
***
Teamwork across units
safety
.21
.03 7.51
1,961
Willingness to report errors
.13
.02 6.04*** 1,959
Staffing
.33
.03 12.30*** 1,903
Organizational learning
.30
.04 8.44*** 1,960
4
Supervisor expectations
Overall
.10
.03 2.97** 1,956
Communication openness
perceptions of
.07
.03 2.18*
1,952
Teamwork across units
safety
.21
.03 7.58*** 1,958
Willingness to report errors
.13
.02 5.89*** 1,956
Staffing
.32
.03 12.07*** 1,908
Organizational learning
.28
.04 7.80*** 1,956
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Hospital Management Support and Overall Perceptions of Safety
Hypothesis 6 stated that hospital management support for safety is positively
related to overall perceptions of patient safety (see Table 12). As predicted, higher levels
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of hospital management support leads to greater overall perceptions of patient safety, F
(1,1441) = 800.94, p < .001. A significant effect of group membership was also found (p
= .006). Using supervisor expectations as a covariate, this hypothesis was further
supported in that hospital management support uniquely contributes to overall
perceptions of patient safety, F (1,1426) = 413.22, p < .001.

Table 12
HLM analysis of hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
***
1
Hospital management
Overall
.46
.02 20.34
1,1426
support
perceptions of
Supervisor expectations
safety
.27
.03 10.68*** 1,1429
about patient safety
*

p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

With support found for the positive relationship between hospital management
support and overall perceptions of safety (Hyp 6), hypotheses 15, 21 and 26 predict
partial mediation of this relationship. Hypothesis 15 stated that teamwork partially
mediates this relationship (see Table 13). HLM analysis revealed a positive relationship
between hospital management support and both teamwork within units (F (1,1445) =
189.87, p < .001) and teamwork across units (F (1,1441) = 617.36, p < .001). Using
covariates, teamwork across units contributed uniquely to overall perceptions of safety (F
(1,961) = 56.33, p < .001), however, teamwork within units did not (F (1,960) = 1.379, p
= .241). Next, hospital management support was entered into the analysis to test for
partial mediation. This hypothesis was partially supported as hospital management
support and teamwork across units were significant, but teamwork within units was not
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(hospital management support: F (1,956) = 71.65, p < .001; teamwork across units: F
(1,960) = 14.08, p < .001; teamwork within units: F (1,960) = 2.78, p = .10).

Table 13
HLM analysis predicting teamwork as a mediating variable between hospital
management support for safety and overall perceptions of safety
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
1
Hospital management
Overall
.41
.02 17.26***
support
perceptions of
Supervisor expectations
safety
.21
.03 7.81***
about patient safety
Feedback and
.16
.02 6.64***
communication
2
Hospital management
Teamwork
.15
.02 6.38***
support
within units
Supervisor expectations
.35
.03 13.22***
3
Teamwork within units
Overall
.04
.03
1.17
Teamwork across units
perceptions of
.21
.03 7.51***
Willingness to report errors safety
.13
.02 6.04***
Staffing
.33
.03 12.30***
Communication openness
3.00**
.09
.03
Organizational learning
.30
.04 8.44***
4
Hospital management
Overall
.24
.03 8.38***
support
perceptions of
Teamwork across units
safety
.12
.03 4.02***
Willingness to report errors
.11
.02 5.19***
Staffing
.30
.03 11.33***
7.45**
Communication openness
.07
.03
Organizational learning
.25
.03 2.65***
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

df
1,1421
1,1425
1,1423
1,1434
1,1435
1,960
1,961
1,959
1,903
1,957
1,960
1,958
1,961
1,960
1,888
1,959
1,960

Similarly, Hypothesis 21 predicted that staffing would partially mediate the
previously supported relationship between hospital management support and overall
perceptions of safety (see Table 14). First, the relationship between hospital management
support and staffing was tested. HLM analysis indicated a positive relationship between
65

the two variables, F (1,1464) = 270.38, p < .001. Using covariates, the relationship
between staffing and overall perceptions of safety was also positive, F (1,926) = 154.74,
p < .001. Finally, HLM analysis supported the hypothesis in that staffing mediated the
relationship between hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety
(hospital management: F (1,981) = 71.93, p < .001; staffing: F (1,911) = 131.21, p <
.001).

Table 14
HLM analysis predicting staffing as a mediating variable between hospital management
support and overall perceptions of safety
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
***
1
Hospital management
Overall
.41
1,1421
.02 17.26
support
perceptions of
Supervisor expectations
safety
.21
.03
7.81*** 1,1425
about patient safety
Feedback and
6.64*** 1,1423
.16
.02
communication
2
Hospital management
Staffing
.35
.02 16.44*** 1,1464
support
3
Staffing
Overall
.33
.03 12.44*** 1,926
3.04**
Communication openness
perceptions of
.09
.03
1,980
1.19
Teamwork within units
safety
.04
.03
1,984
7.60*** 1,984
Teamwork across units
.21
.03
6.11*** 1,982
Willingness to report errors
.13
.02
8.54*** 1,983
Organizational learning
.30
.04
4
Hospital management
Overall
.24
.03
8.48*** 1,981
support
perceptions of
Staffing
safety
.30
.03 11.46*** 1,911
2.68**
Communication openness
.07
.03
1,982
***
4.08
Teamwork across units
1,984
.12
.03
Willingness to report errors
.11
5.24*** 1,983
.02
Organizational learning
.25
.03
7.54*** 1,983
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Hypothesis 26 predicted that communication openness would mediate the
relationship between hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety (see
Table 15). The relationship between hospital management support and communication
openness was tested first, and HLM analysis showed a significant positive relationship
when using supervisor expectations as a covariate, F (1,1342) = 84.09, p < .001, although
no significant group effect was found (p = .442). Next, using covariates, the relationship
between communication openness and overall perceptions of safety was analyzed,
indicating that communication openness does contribute uniquely to overall perceptions
of safety, F (1,957) = 9.00, p < .01. Finally, HLM analysis revealed a partial mediation,
fully supporting this hypothesis (hospital management support: F (1,958) = 70.24, p <
.001; communication openness: F (1,959) = 7.01, p < .01).
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Table 15
HLM analysis predicting communication openness as a mediating variable between
hospital management support and overall perceptions of safety
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
***
1
Hospital management
Overall
.41
.02 17.26
1,1421
support
perceptions of
7.81*** 1,1425
Supervisor expectations
safety
.21
.03
about patient safety
6.64*** 1,1423
Feedback and
.16
.02
communication
2
Hospital management
Communication .22
.02
9.17*** 1,1342
support
openness
Supervisor expectations
.44
.03 16.73*** 1,1285
3
Communication openness
Overall
.09
.03
3.00**
1,957
Teamwork within units
perceptions of
.04
.03
1.17
1,960
Teamwork across units
safety
.21
.03
7.51*** 1,961
Willingness to report errors
.13
.02
6.04*** 1,959
Staffing
.33
.03 12.30*** 1,903
Organizational learning
.30
.04
8.44*** 1,960
4
Hospital management
Overall
.24
.03
8.38*** 1,958
support
perceptions of
Communication openness
safety
.04
.03
2.65**
1,959
Teamwork across units
4.02*** 1,961
.12
.03
Willingness to report errors
5.19*** 1,960
.11
.02
Staffing
.30
.03 11.33*** 1,888
Organizational learning
7.45*** 1,960
.25
.03
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Feedback and Communication about Errors and Overall Perceptions of Safety
Finally, Hypothesis 8a stated that feedback and communication about errors
would be significantly related to overall perceptions of safety (see Table 16). As
predicted, HLM analysis indicated a positive relationship, F (1,1439) = 411.72, p < .001.
Hypothesis 8b stated that organizational learning would partially mediate this relationship
(see Table 16). Using covariates, this relationship was supported (feedback and
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communication: F (1,962) = 15.18, p < .001; organizational learning: F (1,961) = 60.84,
p < .001).

Table 16
HLM analysis predicting organizational learning as a mediating variable between
feedback and communication about errors and overall perceptions of safety
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
1
Feedback and
Overall
.16
.02
3.64
communication
perceptions of
Supervisor expectations
safety
.21
.03
7.81
Hospital management
support
.41
.02
17.26
2
Feedback and
Organizational
.42
.02 22.04***
communication
learning
3
Organizational learning
Overall
.33
.04 9.01***
Willingness to report errors perceptions of
.14
.02 6.27***
Staffing
safety
.37
.03 13.69***
Communication openness
.12
.03 3.95***
Teamwork within units
3.09*
.07
.03
4
Feedback and
Overall
.12
.03 3.90***
communication
perceptions of
Organizational learning
safety
.29
.04 7.80***
Willingness to report errors
.11
.02 4.93***
Staffing
.37
.03 13.73***
Communication openness
.08
2.48*
.03
Teamwork within units
1.98*
.06
.03
*
**
***
p < .05, p < .01, p < .001

df
1,1423
1,1425
1,1421
1,1414
1,964
1,963
1,893
1,959
1,963
1,962
1,961
1,961
1,891
1,957
1,963

DV: Patient Safety Grade
Hypotheses 3, 7, 9a, 9b, 13, 16, 24, and 27 predicted relationships involving the
dependent variable ‘patient safety grade’. To test these hypotheses, HLM analyses were
conducted using individual level data.
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Supervisor Expectations about Safety and Patient Safety Grade
Hypothesis 3 stated that supervisor expectations are related to patient safety grade
within units (see Table 17). Using hospital management support and feedback and
communication about errors as covariates, the HLM analysis found support for this
hypothesis, F (1,1420) = 86.41, p < .001, indicating that higher supervisor expectations
leads to higher patient safety grade.

Table 17
HLM analysis of supervisor expectations about patient safety and patient safety grade
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
***
1
Supervisor expectations Patient safety
.27
.03
1,1420
9.30
about patient safety
grade
Hospital management
.36
.03 14.20*** 1,1419
support
Feedback and
9.25*** 1,1419
.25
.03
communication
*
**
p < .05, p < .01, ***p < .001

With support found for the positive relationship between supervisor expectations
and patient safety grade (Hyp 3), Hypotheses 13 and 24 predict partial mediation of this
relationship. Hypothesis 13 predicted teamwork as the mediating variable (see Table 18).
Analyses conducted as a part of hypothesis 12 demonstrated a positive relationship
between supervisor expectations and teamwork. To test the relationship between
teamwork and patient safety grade, HLM analysis was run. Results show, using
covariates, that teamwork within units does significantly contribute to patient safety
grade, F (1,963) = 34.79, p < .001. Unlike that of hypothesis 12, support was found for
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the mediating relationship (supervisor expectations: F (1,960) = 22.30, p < .001;
teamwork within units: F (1, 959) = 30.90, p < .001).

Table 18
HLM analysis predicting teamwork within units as a mediating variable between
supervisor expectations about patient safety and patient safety grade
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
1
Supervisor expectations
Patient safety
.27
.03
9.30***
about patient safety
grade
Hospital management
.36
.03 14.20***
support
Feedback and
.25
.03
9.25***
communication
2
Supervisor expectations
Teamwork
.35
.03 13.22***
Hospital management
within units
support
.15
.02
6.38***
3
Teamwork within units
Patient safety
.20
.03
5.90***
7.37***
Willingness to report errors grade
.17
.02
8.33***
Staffing
.24
.03
5.70***
Communication openness
.19
.03
Organizational learning
.28
6.62***
.04
4
Supervisor expectations
Patient safety
.17
.04
4.72***
Teamwork within units
grade
.19
.03
5.56***
7.12***
Willingness to report errors
.17
.02
Staffing
1.45***
.22
.03
Communication openness
4.07***
.14
.03
Organizational learning
.20
.04
4.94***
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

df
1,1420
1,1419
1,1419
1,1435
1,1434
1,963
1,964
1,757
1,962
1,963
1,960
1,959
1,960
1,790
1,956
1,959

Hypothesis 24 was analyzed at the individual level to test communication
openness as a partial mediating factor of the relationship between supervisor expectations
and patient safety grade (see Table 19). As proven in Hypothesis 23, supervisor support is
positively related to communication openness. Therefore, the first step of this analysis
was to test the relationship between communication openness and patient safety grade.
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Using covariates, the relationship between communication openness and patient safety
grade was tested, and a significant positive relationship was found, F (1,960) = 23.75, p <
.001. Finally, as predicted, HLM analysis revealed a partially mediating relationship
(supervisor expectations: F (1,957) = 19.85, p < .001; communication openness: F
(1,954) = 11.44, p < .01).

Table 19
HLM analysis predicting communication openness as a mediating variable between
supervisor expectations about patient safety and patient safety grade
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
***
1
Supervisor expectations
Patient safety
.27
.03
9.30
1,1420
about patient safety
grade
Hospital management
.36
.03
14.20*** 1,1419
support
9.25*** 1,1419
Feedback and
.25
.03
communication
2
Supervisor expectations
Communication
.44
.03
16.73*** 1,1284
Hospital management
openness
9.17*** 1,1342
support
.22
.02
3
Communication openness
Patient safety
.16
.03
4.87*** 1,960
5.14*** 1,960
Teamwork within units
grade
.18
.03
6.68*** 1,959
Teamwork across units
.20
.03
7.14*** 1,961
Willingness to report errors
.16
.02
7.01*** 1,780
Staffing
.20
.03
6.01*** 1,961
Organizational learning
.23
.04
4
Supervisor expectations
Patient safety
.16
.04
4.46*** 1,957
3.38** 1,954
Communication openness
grade
.11
.03
4.84*** 1,956
Teamwork within units
.16
.03
6.56*** 1,955
Teamwork across units
.19
.03
6.91*** 1,957
Willingness to report errors
.16
.02
6.23*** 1,805
Staffing
.18
.03
4.45*** 1,957
Organizational learning
.18
.04
*
**
***
p < .05, p < .01, p < .001
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Hospital Management Support and Patient Safety Grade
Hypothesis 7 stated that hospital management support is related to patient safety
grade (see Table 20). Using supervisor expectations and feedback and communication
about errors as covariates, the HLM analysis found support for this hypothesis, F
(1,1419) = 201.76, p < .001, indicating that higher perceptions of hospital management
support leads to a higher patient safety grade.
Table 20
HLM analysis of hospital management support for safety and patient safety grade
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
1
Hospital management
Patient safety
.36
.03
14.20*** 1,1419
support
grade
Supervisor expectations
.27
.03
9.29*** 1,1420
about patient safety
Feedback and
.25
.03
9.25*** 1,1419
communication
*
**
p < .05, p < .01, ***p < .001

As support for Hypotheses 7 was found, Hypotheses 16 and 27 predict mediating
relationships between hospital management support and patient safety grade.
Specifically, Hypothesis 16 predicted that teamwork within and across units will partially
mediate this relationship (see Table 21). Hypothesis 15 revealed a positive relationship
between hospital management support and teamwork within and across units. HLM
analysis also revealed a positive relationship between teamwork within units (F (1,960) =
26.40, p < .001) and across units (F (1,959) = 44.59, p < .001) and patient safety grade.
To test the partially mediating relationship, hospital management support was entered
into the relationship. HLM analysis found support for this hypothesis (hospital
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management support: F (1,960) = 48.14, p < .001; teamwork across units: F (1,955) =
12.35, p < .001; teamwork within units: F (1,958) = 31.79, p < .001).

Table 21
HLM analysis predicting teamwork as a mediating variable between hospital
management support and patient safety grade
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
1
Hospital management
Patient safety
.36
.03
14.20***
support
grade
Supervisor expectations
.27
.03
9.29***
about patient safety
9.25***
Feedback and
.25
.03
communication
2
Hospital management
Teamwork
.15
.02
6.38***
support
within units
Supervisor expectations
.35
.03
13.22***
3
Hospital management
Teamwork
.46
.02
19.70***
support
across units
Supervisor expectations
.11
.03
4.16***
4
Teamwork within units
Patient safety
.20
.03
5.90***
Willingness to report
grade
.17
.02
7.37***
errors
Staffing
.24
.03
8.33***
Communication openness
.19
5.70***
.03
Organizational learning
6.62***
.28
.04
5
Hospital management
Patient safety
.22
.03
6.94***
support
grade
Teamwork within units
.19
.03
5.64***
3.52***
Teamwork across units
.11
.03
6.41***
Willingness to report
.15
.02
errors
5.67***
Staffing
.03
.03
4.28***
Communication openness
.03
.03
Organizational learning
.04
.04
4.36***
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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df
1,1419
1,1420
1,1419
1,1434
1,1435
1,1430
1,1432
1,963
1,964
1,757
1,962
1,963
1,960
1,958
1,955
1,960
1,766
1,959
1,960

As hypothesis 7 was supported and differences among group membership were
found, Hypothesis 27 (relationship between hospital management support and patient
safety grade is partially mediated by communication openness) was analyzed using HLM
analysis (see Table 22). First, the relationship between hospital management support and
communication openness was tested. Using supervisor expectations about safety as a
covariate, results indicated that higher perceptions of hospital management support leads
to higher perceptions of communication openness, F (1,1342) = 84.09, p < .001. Using
covariates, the relationship between communication openness and patient safety grade
was tested, and a significant positive relationship was also found, F (1,960) = 23.75, p <
.001. Finally, HLM analysis revealed support for the mediating relationship (hospital
management support: F (1,960) = 48.14, p < .001; communication openness: F (1,959) =
18.32, p < .001).
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Table 22
HLM analysis predicting communication openness as a mediating variable between
hospital management support for safety and patient safety grade
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
***
1,1419
1
Hospital management
Patient safety
.36
.03
14.20
support
grade
9.29*** 1,1420
Supervisor expectations
.27
.03
about patient safety
Feedback and
.25
.03
9.25*** 1,1419
communication
2
Hospital management
Communication .22
.02
9.17*** 1,1342
support
openness
16.73*** 1,1285
Supervisor expectations
.44
.03
3
Communication openness
Patient safety
.16
.03
4.87*** 1,960
Teamwork within units
grade
.18
.03
5.14*** 1,960
Teamwork across units
.20
.03
6.68*** 1,959
Willingness to report errors
.16
.02
7.14*** 1,961
Staffing
.20
.03
7.01*** 1,780
Organizational learning
.23
.04
6.01*** 1,961
5
Hospital management
Patient safety
.22
.03
6.94*** 1,960
support
grade
Communication openness
.14
.03
4.28*** 1,959
Teamwork within units
.19
.03
5.64*** 1,958
Teamwork across units
.11
.03
3.52*** 1,955
Willingness to report errors
.15
.02
6.41*** 1,960
Staffing
.16
.03
5.67*** 1,766
Organizational learning
.17
.04
4.36*** 1,960
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Feedback and Communication about Errors and Patient Safety Grade
Hypothesis 9a stated that feedback and communication about errors would be
significantly related to patient safety grade (see Table 23). As predicted, HLM analysis
indicated a positive relationship, F (1,1434) = 515.73, p < .001. Hypothesis 9b stated that
organizational learning would partially mediate this relationship (see Table 23). First, the
relationship between feedback and communication and organizational learning was tested
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and a positive relationship was found, F (1,1414) = 485.79, p < .001. Next, using
covariates, the relationship between organizational learning and patient safety grade was
analyzed. HLM analysis revealed that organizational learning does contribute uniquely to
patient safety grade, F (1,963) = 43.84, p < .001. Finally, using covariates, the partially
mediated relationship was supported (feedback and communication: F (1,962) = 32.64, p
< .001; organizational learning: F (1,963) = 25.36, p < .001).

Table 23
HLM analysis predicting organizational learning as a mediating variable between
feedback and communication about errors and patient safety grade
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
1
Feedback and
Patient safety
.16
.02
3.64 1,1423
communication
grade
Supervisor expectations
.21
.03
7.81 1,1425
Hospital management
support
.41
.02
17.26 1,1421
2
Feedback and
Organizational
.42
.02 22.04*** 1,1414
communication
learning
3
Organizational learning
Patient safety
.33
.04 9.01*** 1,964
Willingness to report errors grade
.14
.02 6.27*** 1,963
Staffing
.37
.03 13.69*** 1,893
Communication openness
.12
.03 3.95*** 1,959
Teamwork within units
3.09* 1,963
.07
.03
4
Feedback and
Patient safety
.12
.03 3.90*** 1,962
communication
grade
Organizational learning
.29
.04 7.80*** 1,961
Willingness to report errors
.11
.02 4.93*** 1,961
Staffing
.37
.03 13.73*** 1,891
Communication openness
2.48* 1,957
.08
.03
1.98* 1,963
Teamwork within units
.06
.03
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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DV: Number of Events Reported
Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 18a and 18b predicted relationships involving the dependent
variable ‘number of events reported’. Number of events reported indicates the number of
events reported by each participant in the last 12 months. To test these hypotheses, HLM
analyses were conducted using individual level data.

Hospital Management Support and Number of Events Reported
Hypothesis 4a stated that hospital management support would be positively
related to number of events reported by participants (see Table 24). The HLM analysis
with the individual level data found a significant effect of hospital management support,
F (1,1368) = 22.52, p < .001. However, the relationship found was in the opposite
direction. Specifically, higher perceptions of hospital management support leads to fewer
events reported by employees.
Hypothesis 4b stated that willingness to report events partially mediates the
relationship between hospital management support and number of events reported (see
Table 24). Using non-punitive response to errors as a covariate, the HLM analysis
revealed a positive relationship between hospital management support and willingness to
report errors (F (1,964) = 62.62, p < .001). The test of the relationship between
willingness to report events and number of events reported was not significant (F (1,738)
= .278, p = .598). Because of this, the test of the mediating relationship was not
continued. Therefore, only part of Hypothesis 4b was supported. The reason for this
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could be that hospital management support not only leads to a willingness to report errors
but also leads to a safer environment (i.e., fewer errors), and while employees are willing
to report errors, they don’t have the opportunity.

Table 24
HLM analysis predicting willingness to report events as a mediating variable between
hospital management support for safety and number of events reported
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
1
Hospital management
Willingness to
.29
.04 7.91*** 1,964
support
report
Non-punitive response to
.23
.04 6.44*** 1,964
errors
2
Hospital management
Number of
-.18
.04 -4.95*** 1,1398
support
events reported
Non-punitive response to
.05
.04
1.42 1,1413
errors
3
Willingness to report
Number of
.02
.04
.527
1,737
events reported
4
Hospital management
Number of
-.12
.044 -2.79** 1,931
support
events reported
Willingness to report
.05
.038
1.36
1,952
*
**
***
p < .05, p < .01, p < .001

Non-punitive Response to Errors and Number of Events Reported
Hypothesis 18a stated that a non-punitive response to errors would be positively
related to number of event reported by participants (see Table 25). The HLM analysis
with the individual level data did not reveal a significant effect of a non-punitive response
to events, F (1,1347) = .044, p = .833, nor a significant effect of group membership (p =
.154).
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Hypothesis 18b stated that willingness to report events partially mediates the
relationship between non-punitive response to events and number of events reported (see
Table 25). Using hospital management support as a covariate, a non-punitive response to
errors is positively related to willingness to report events (F (1,964) = 62.62, p < .001). In
other words, when there is less retribution for making an error, employees are more likely
to report them. When testing the mediating relationship, Hypothesis 18b was not
supported (non-punitive response to events: F (1,913) = 1.14, p = .285; willingness to
report events: F (1,832) = .053, p = .818).

Table 25
HLM analysis predicting willingness to report errors as a mediating variable between
non-punitive response to errors and number of events reported
Model
Predictor
Criterion
Estimate SE
t
df
1
Non-punitive response to Number of
.05
.04
1.42 1,1413
errors
events reported
Hospital management
-.18
.04
-4.95*** 1,1398
support
2
Non-punitive response to Willingness to
.23
.04
6.44*** 1,964
errors
report errors
Hospital management
.29
.04
7.91*** 1,964
support
3
Willingness to report
Number of
.02
.04
.527
1,738
errors
events reported
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

DV: Incidents
Hypotheses 1, 11, 14, 22, and 25, predicted relationships regarding incidents
within units. Incidents are defined as the total number of incidents deemed reportable by
the hospital in a 12 month period. Incidents include medication (e.g., wrong dosage of a
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drug administered) and non-medication (e.g., wrong site surgery) type incidents. Because
incident data is only available at the unit level, regression analysis was the method used
to test these hypotheses.

Supervisor Expectations about Safety and Incidents
Hypothesis 1 predicted that supervisor expectations are negatively related to
incidents (see Table 26). Using regression and controlling for hospital management
support, this hypothesis was not supported, F (2,1437) = 2.05, p = .129. Additional
analyses were run to determine if there was a relationship between supervisor
expectations and incident type. Incidents were broken down into medication and nonmedication incidents, and covariate used to test the relationship (see Table 26). Contrary
to expectations, supervisor expectations were positively related to medication incidents,
indicating an increase in medication incidents in units with higher supervisor
expectations, F (3,1436) = 68.41, p < .001. As would be expected, supervisor
expectations were negatively related to non-medication incidents, F (3,1436) = 66.88, p <
.001, although both of these relationships were weak.
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Table 26
Regression analysis testing the relationship between supervisor expectations about
patient safety and incidents
Model
Predictor
Criterion
β
R2
R2 ∆
p
*
.003 .003 .048
1
Supervisor expectations Incidents
.061
about patient safety
-.043
Hospital management
support
2
Supervisor expectations Medication
.118*** .125 .010 .000
about patient safety
incidents
Hospital management
.009
support
Non-medication
.340***
incidents
3
Supervisor expectations Non-medication
-.068* .123 .003 .020
about patient safety
incidents
Hospital management
-.062
support
Medication incidents
.341***
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Hypothesis 11 stated that teamwork partially mediates the relationship between
supervisor expectations and incidents. As previously discussed in Hypothesis 1, a
relationship was not found between supervisor expectations and incidents. Exploratory
analysis was conducted, however, to test the mediating relationship between supervisor
expectations and incidents by type (medication and non-medication). Although the
relationships were weak, medication incidents were positively related to supervisor
expectations (contrary to expectations) and non-medication incidents were negatively
related. Therefore, the test of mediation was continued to see if teamwork within units
mediated either of these relationships (Hyp 14). First the relationship between teamwork
within units was tested with medication and non-medication incidents. A positive
relationship was found between teamwork within units and medication incidents (β =
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.068. p < .05), whereas a negative relationship was found between teamwork and nonmedication incidents (β = -.117, p < .001). Next, the mediation was tested. When
controlling for non-medication incidents, teamwork within units was shown to partially
mediate the relationship between supervisor expectations about patient safety and
medication incidents. However, when additional covariates were entered, this relationship
was no longer supported. Likewise results were found for teamwork within units partially
mediating the relationship between supervisor expectations and non-medication
incidents. Further exploration identified perceptions of staffing to strongest contributor to
the variance.
As discussed in Hypothesis 1, supervisor expectations regarding safety were not
related to incidents, however, further analysis revealed a relationship when incidents
were broken down by type. Specifically a positive relationship was found with
medication incidents whereas a negative relationship was found with non-medication
incidents. Although Hypothesis 22 suggested that communication openness would
mediate the relationship between supervisor expectations and incidents as a whole, the
decision was made to test it as a mediating variable using medication and non-medication
events. Because a positive relationship between supervisor expectations and
communication openness had been previously established (Hyp 23), the first step was to
test the relationship between communication openness and incidents by type. Using
covariates, this relationship did not prove significant in either case (medication incidents:
β = -.051, p = .058; non-medication incidents: β = .019, p = .486), and therefore, the
mediating relationship was not further tested.
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Hospital Management Support and Incidents
Hypothesis 14 stated that teamwork partially mediates the relationship between
hospital management support and incidents. To test this relationship, the first step was to
test the direct relationship between hospital management support and incidents.
Controlling for supervisor expectations about safety, sequential regression did not reveal
a significant relationship (β = -.043, F (2,1437) = 2.05, p = .129). Although not
hypothesized, additional analyses were run to identify a potential relationship between
hospital management support and medication or non-medication incidents. No significant
relationship was found between hospital management support and medication incidents,
when controlling for supervisor expectations and non-medication incidents (β = .009, p =
.745). As would be expected, a negative relationship was found between hospital
management support and non-medication incidents, when controlling for supervisor
expectations and medication incidents (F (1,1436) = 66.88, p < .001). Because only the
relationship between teamwork within units and non-medication incidents was
significant, this variable was used to test mediation. Using covariates, in step 2 of
sequential regression the relationship between hospital management support and nonmedication errors was no longer significant (β = -.041, p = .163). Because of this, the test
of mediation was not continued.
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Table 27
Regression analysis predicting a relationship between hospital management support for
safety and incidents
Model
Predictor
Criterion
β
R2
R2 ∆
p
1
Hospital management
Incidents
-.043 .003 .001 .164
support
.061
Supervisor expectations
2
Hospital management
Non-medication
-.062* .123 .003 .032
support
incidents
-.068*
Supervisor expectations
.341***
Medication incidents
3
Hospital management
Non-medication
-.029 .132 .010 .163
support
incidents
-.043
Supervisor expectations
.368***
Medication
.001
Communication openness
-.108***
Staffing
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Hypothesis 25 stated that communication openness partially mediates the
relationship between hospital management support and incidents (see Table 31).
Although no relationship was found between hospital management support and incidents,
a relationship was found between hospital management support and non-medication
incidents (Hyp 14). Therefore, the test of mediation was continued. The relationship
between communication and openness and non-medication incidents was tested using
covariates. Sequential regression did not show a relationship (β = .022, p = .439) and
therefore further testing of the mediation was discontinued.
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Table 28
Regression analysis predicting a relationship between communication openness and nonmedication incidents
Model
Predictor
Criterion
β
R2
R2 ∆
p
1
Communication openness Non-medication
.022
.142 .142 .439
Teamwork within units
incidents
-.117
Teamwork across units
.030
Staffing
-.095
Medication incidents
.377
*
**
***
p < .05, p < .01, p < .001

DV: Unit Reporting Rates
Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 19a and 19b, predicted relationships surrounding the
dependent variable ‘unit reporting rates’. Unit reporting rates are the percentage of events
reported per unit per number of patient days. Because unit reporting rates are only
available at the unit level, regression analysis was the method used to test these
hypotheses.

Hospital Management Support and Unit Reporting Rates
Hypothesis 5a predicted that hospital management support and unit reporting rates
would be positively related (see Table 32). Using non-punitive response to errors as a
covariate, this hypothesis was supported, although the relationship was weak, R2 = .016, β
= .045, F (2,1343) = 10.71, p < .001. Hypothesis 5b predicted that willingness to report
events would partially mediate this relationship. Regression analysis revealed that
hospital management support is positively related to willingness to report errors (R2 =
.167, β = .281, F (2,966) = 97.13, p < .001) and willingness to report errors is positively
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related to unit reporting rates (R2= .015, β = .124, F (1,910) = 14.11, p < .001). Finally,
results showed that the partially mediating relationship was supported (hospital
management support: β = .076, p < .05; willingness to report: β = .095, p < .01; R2= .020,
F (2,909) = 9.42, p < .001).

Table 29
Regression analysis predicting willingness to report errors as a mediating variable
between hospital management support for safety and unit reporting rates
R2 ∆
Model
Predictor
Criterion
β
R2
p
***
1
Hospital management
Willingness to
.281
.167 .068 .001
***
support
report errors
.212
Non-punitive response to
errors
2
Hospital management
Unit reporting
.089** .016 .007 .001
support
rates
.060*
Non-punitive response to
errors
3
Willingness to report
Unit reporting
.124*** .015 .015 .001
errors
rates
4
Hospital management
Unit reporting
.076* .020 .008 .007
support
rates
.095**
Willingness to report
errors
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Non-punitive Response to Errors and Unit Reporting Rates
Hypothesis 19a stated that a non-punitive response to errors will be positively
related to unit reporting rates (see Table 33). When controlling for hospital management,
results suggest that a non-punitive response to errors leads to higher unit reporting rates,
thus supporting this hypothesis (R2= .016, F (2,1343) = 10.71, p < .001). Hypothesis 19b

87

predicted that willingness to report errors will partially mediate this relationship. This
hypothesis was also supported (R2= .030, F (2,908) = 13.98, p < .001).

Table 30
Regression analysis predicting willingness to report errors as a mediating variable
between non-punitive response to errors and unit reporting rates
R2 ∆
Model
Predictor
Criterion
β
R2
1
Non-punitive response to Unit reporting rates
.060* .016 .003
errors
Hospital management
.089**
support
2
Non-punitive response to Willingness to
.212*** .167 .039
errors
report
Hospital management
.281***
support
3
Willingness to report
Unit reporting rates .124*** .015 .015
4
Non-punitive response to Unit reporting rates .127*** .030 .006
errors
Willingness to report
.084*
*
p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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p
.040

.001

.001
.015

SECTION 5 - DISCUSSION
Safety culture is a ‘buzz word’ that receives a lot of attention in high consequence
environments. Research within aviation and beyond has examined what it takes to
develop a positive safety culture—management support, promotion of a learning
environment, documentation of errors, rewarding safe behaviors, among others.
However, little research, especially in healthcare, has linked a positive safety culture to
outcomes. Areas outside of healthcare have demonstrated that a positive safety culture
leads to an increase in safe behaviors and a reduction and errors. Making this link is not
an easy task—it requires a commitment from the organization to supply the resources
necessary. The purpose of this research was to take a first look at linking perceptions of
safety culture to patient safety outcomes within five critical care units—emergency
department, surgery, intensive care, perinatal and pediatrics. Specifically, the AHRQ
HSOPS was chosen as the measure for this dissertation which assesses both dimensions
of safety culture as well as outcome variables. In addition, objective patient safety
outcome data was also gathered (e.g., incidents, unit reporting rates) to better understand
this relationship. Using high reliability theory as an organizing framework, a number of
hypotheses were tested to uncover this seldom studied relationship.

Sensitivity to Operations
The first organizational value exhibited by HROs is sensitivity to operations, in
which the purpose is to set the tone in the organization and its work units. This is
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encouraged by supervisors who continuously monitor and discuss events as they occur as
a means to promoting patient safety. As predicted, supervisor expectations regarding
safety, hospital management support towards safety, explicit supervisor expectations
about safety, and feedback and communication about errors are positively related to
overall perceptions of safety and patient safety grade (i.e., Hyp 2, 3, 6, 7, 8a, 9a and 10).
Previous research examining this link in the healthcare community was not found.
However, these findings are consistent with research outside of healthcare which has
shown that commitment from upper level management to safety and safe practices and
feedback about errors lead to more positive attitudes (e.g., Cox et al., 1998; DePasquale
& Geller, 1999; O’Toole, 2002; Zohar, 1980). Executive walkrounds, safety briefings,
and safety training programs are suggestions for how management at all levels can show
their commitment to safety.
It was also hypothesized that this commitment from management would increase
the number of events reported by employees and units (Hyp 3, 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b). A
relationship was found between these predictor and criterion variables, however,
employees response to the number of events that they reported in the last 12 months was
in the opposite direction than predicted. Because the data also showed that employees are
willing to report events when they occur, the likely explanation for these results is that
management commitment to safety (i.e., support, explicit expectations, feedback about
errors) leads to a safer environment and thus fewer errors to report.
Likewise, organizational learning was shown to mediate the relationship between
feedback and communication and overall perceptions of safety (Hyp 9a and 9b). This
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indicates that when management provides feedback about errors that have occurred
within a unit, employees perceive this as a willingness of the organization to learn from
what happened rather than to cover it up. This further supports research that suggests that
the cause of an error should be investigated (not just the outcome of the incident) and
when its cause is determined, the whole organization should learn from it (Barling &
Zacharatos, 1999). Discussing errors that have occurred without placing blame allows
employees to learn from these errors and to avoid, trap, or mitigate the consequences of
similar errors in the future before a serious incident occurs (Helmreich, Merritt, &
Wilhelm, 1999; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998).
Limited support was found for hypothesis 1 which predicted that supervisor
expectations would be negatively related to incidents. In terms of overall incidents, no
relationship was found between supervisor expectations and incidents. Further analysis of
this relationship revealed contradictory results—medication incidents were positively
related to supervisor expectations and non-medication incidents were negatively related
(as would be expected), although this relationship was weak. Additional research is
needed to understand why this may be the case.

Reluctance to Simplify
Teamwork on the front lines has been promoted in healthcare as a means to
improving safety (e.g., Small, 1998). However, teamwork does not just happen; it must
be promoted and supported by management albeit through training, team building or
other means (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). The previous set of hypotheses discussed
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indicated that a supportive environment by management leads to more positive
perceptions of safety. Furthermore, hospital management support and supervisor
expectations were positively related to teamwork, and teamwork is related to overall
perceptions of safety and patient safety grade. However, overall the data to support the
mediating relationship of teamwork within and across units was mixed (Hyp 11-16).
Based on definitions of the constructs, teamwork within units served as the mediator for
relationships involving supervisor expectations, and both teamwork within and across
units were mediators for relationships involving hospital management support. For
example, teamwork within units fully mediated (although only partial mediation was
hypothesized) the relationship between supervisor expectations and non-medication
incidents (Hyp 11), as well as hospital management support and non-medication incidents
(Hyp 14) (teamwork across units was not significant). As predicted, teamwork within
units partially mediated the relationship between supervisor expectations and patient
safety grade (Hyp 13). Teamwork within units as a mediating variable between
supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of safety was not supported (Hyp 12).
Teamwork within units also did not serve as a mediating variable between hospital
management support and overall perceptions of safety, although teamwork across units
did (Hyp 15). Finally, both teamwork within units and teamwork across units served as
mediators of the relationship between hospital management support and patient safety
grade (Hyp 16).
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Preoccupation with Failure
HROs also demonstrate a preoccupation with failure in that, no matter how big or
small, incidents that occur serve as a learning experience (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). To
promote this, organizations encourage employees to report errors when they occur,
without fear of retribution. Results of this research supported this, indicated by a
significant, positive correlation between hospital management support for safety and a
non-punitive response to errors (Hyp 17). Furthermore, support was found for the
relationship between a non-punitive response to errors and unit reporting rates.
Specifically, in units in which a non-punitive response to errors is perceived, there was
also a higher number of errors reported (i.e., unit reporting rates), and employees
willingness to report errors mediated this relationship, although the relationship was weak
(Hyp 19a and 19b). Contrary to predictions, there was not a relationship between a nonpunitive response to errors and number of events reported by each employee (Hyp 18a
and 18b). It may likely be the case that while employees are willing to report errors, the
safe ‘environment’ in which they work mitigates the consequences of errors before they
become a reportable incident.

Commitment to Resilience
HROs demonstrate a commitment to resilience by containing or managing
unexpected events. This commitment is promoted in organizations by ensuring adequate
resources, such as staffing levels, are available. Support was found for the importance of
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staffing in that perceptions of staffing served as a mediating variable between hospital
management support and overall perceptions of safety (Hyp 21). This indicates that
hospital management's commitment to safety through adequate staffing levels has a
positive impact on overall perceptions of safety. Furthermore, it was also predicted that
staff turnover would be negatively correlated with perceptions of staffing, overall
perceptions of safety and patient safety grade. Only partial support was found in that staff
turnover was negatively correlated with overall perceptions of safety, suggesting that
when staff turnover increases, overall perceptions of safety decrease.

Deference to Expertise
Deference to expertise is the fifth characteristic exhibited by HROs to contain, as
well as identify, the unexpected. It has been suggested that good information flow
between management and employees will lead to a more positive safety culture (WilsonDonnelly, Priest, Burke, & Salas, 2005). When employees feel that management is
committed to safety, they will feel more comfortable communicating their ideas and
opinions, and not hiding mistakes that are made. In addition, employees must feel
comfortable asserting themselves to colleagues, an action sometimes discouraged in
healthcare yet has a great impact on effective patient safety (e.g., Zwarenstein & Reeves,
2002). Up until this point, positive relationships have been found between hospital
management and supervisor support for safety and overall perceptions of safety and
patient safety grade. In line with this, communication openness was predicted to partially
mediate the relationship between supervisor expectations and overall perceptions of
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safety. These hypotheses were supported indicating that a commitment from management
to safety will lead to greater communication openness and subsequent higher perceptions
of safety (Hyp 23, 24, 26, and 27). Contrary to predictions, communication openness did
not partially mediate the relationship between management commitment and incidents as
a whole, or when broken down by incident type (Hyp 22 and 25).

Summary
Given these findings, the question to be answered is “Does safety culture predict
clinical outcomes?” The question may not be that easy however. Indeed, perceptions of
management commitment to safety in work units do influence their overall perceptions of
safety in that unit. Furthermore, this commitment from management results in the
willingness of staff to report errors should they occur. In addition, providing feedback
about errors that occur leads to higher perceptions of organizational learning, further
encouraging the reporting of errors. However, the low number of incidents that occurred
in the organization examined here made it difficult to link safety culture and incidents.
Although weak, a relationship does seem to exist between perceptions of safety culture
and reportable (i.e., to the state) non-medication type incidents. This research is just the
tip of the iceberg. Additional research is needed to better understand this relationship.
Research must also focus on those incidents that occur, yet don’t meet standards for
reporting (i.e., near misses), as they may be more indicative as whether a relationship
exists or not.
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Limitations and Implications for Future Research
Several limitations to this research should be noted. First, the data collected as a
part of this research was primarily self-report. Given the sensitive nature of the data, it is
possible that participants may have provided socially desirable responses to the survey. In
other words, respondents may have provided more positive response to questions to give
the impression of greater safety in their work units.
Similarly, the generalizability of present findings may have been negatively
impacted by the low response rate on the survey. Because of this, it is not possible to
compare the respondents with non-respondents to determine if any systematic differences
exist between these two groups. Low response rates are a common problem in
organizational survey research, and some research suggests differences between
respondents and non-respondents such as lower job satisfaction, greater intentions for
turnover, and weaker organizational commitment (e.g., Rogelberg, Luong, Sederburg, &
Cristol, 2000). Others research suggests that non-respondents are less conscientious and
low agreeableness (Rogelberg, Conway, Sederburg, Spitzmüller, Aziz, & Knight, 2003).
Similar conclusions may be identified in non-respondents to this research, for example,
less willingness to report errors and lower perceptions of safety. As a consequence of low
response, it is possible that the ranges of scores on some variables were restricted. Future
research efforts should focus on expanding the respondent pool by encouraging all
employees to participate as well as utilizing multiple methods (e.g., interviews, focus
groups) to gather a more representative view of the organization’s safety culture.
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A third weakness of this research focuses on the use of a single survey to collect
much of the data. One of the concerns with this type of measure is that both predictor and
criterion variables are collected using the same method, with the potential of monomethod bias. However, given two of the dependent variables involve individual
perceptions (i.e., patient safety grade and overall perceptions of safety). Therefore, it is
not feasible to use another data source (e.g., supervisors’ perceptions of employees’
perceptions) to gather this data—it would not be reliable. Furthermore, while the
dependent variables could have been collected at another point in time, a self-report
measure of participant’s perceptions would still introduce the same concerns. To help
alleviate these concerns, it has been suggested that some items on the measure be reverse
worded and that items for predictor and criterion variables be intermixed (e.g., Cook &
Campbell, 1977). The HSOPS demonstrates both of these suggestions. To also alleviate
these concerns, several additional objective criterion variables were collected from
different data sources to use as a part of this research. Research in the area of safety
culture must continue to gather data from multiple sources to understand the true impact
of safety culture on clinical outcomes.
Finally, there are a number of difficulties for establishing a clear cause and effect
between safety culture and incidents. After all, this data is difficult to collect—limited
resources, fear of retribution, and low number of reportable incidents that occur in
healthcare. As the results suggested, respondents are willing to report events when they
occur, however, there appears to be limited opportunities to do so. Future research should
consider investigating the link between safety culture perceptions and near-miss
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incidents. The healthcare community is beginning to recognize the importance of nearmiss incidents and the Veteran’s Affairs (VA) and NASA have teamed up to develop the
Patient Safety Reporting System (PSRS) (www.psrs.arc.nasa.gov). Currently this system
is only available to VA hospital employees. However, some hospitals utilize internal
systems to track near-misses and these incidents need to studied.

Practical Implications
This study is useful in directing attention to the understudied relationship between
safety culture and clinical outcomes. The findings support previous research in that
hospital management and supervisor support for safety does improve overall perceptions
of safety. This research extended the literature by investigating the link between safety
culture perceptions and objective outcomes—incidents.
Several hypotheses investigated as a part of this research examined the
relationship between perceptions of safety culture and incidents. The results suggest that
when incidents are looked at as a whole (i.e., all incidents which occurred within a unit),
no relationship existed. However, when incidents were broken down by type, namely
medication versus non-medication errors, interesting results were found. In fact, a more
positive safety culture was linked to an increase in medication type incidents. These
results initially seem counterintuitive. To suggest a positive relationship between safety
culture and medication incidents on the surface detracts from the research in other
domains suggesting the opposite. It could be the case that an increase in incidents leads
an organization to implement additional patient safety efforts, and therefore employees
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perceive a more positive safety culture. Additional research is needed to investigate this,
as well as the impact of a positive safety culture on other types of incidents. For example,
it remains to be seen whether a positive safety culture has a different impact on severe
(i.e., life threatening) versus non-severe incidents.
In line with the above, it can not be concluded that when an incident occurs, that
learning actually takes place. The data suggests that management that supports a safety
culture provides feedback regarding incidents that occur, and thus employees perceive
organizational learning. However, does this communication about incidents actually lead
to behavioral change? For example, Desai and colleagues (2006) examined accidents in
aviation and found that better learning occurred from accidents of moderate severity. The
reason suggested is that these incidents were salient enough that they prompted
improvement without being overly complex in which recovery efforts would face
challenges. Organizations need to understand which incidents will have the greatest
impact on learning. Therefore, future research needs to examine the short term and long
term effects of incidents and other patient safety initiatives.
This research also has implications for safety-related behaviors. The findings
suggest that in environments in which employees perceive a positive safety culture, they
are also more willing to report incidents when they occur. It is likely that the positive
perceptions of safety culture will translate in to other positive safe behaviors such as
monitoring of team members performance, less risk taking behavior, and asking for help
when overloaded, among others. Additional research should seek to uncover how a
positive safety culture impacts these and other safe behaviors in the workplace.
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Finally, this research used high reliability theory as a framework. While a direct
cause and effect relationship can not be made between the organizational values posited
by HRT (e.g., organizations promoting sensitivity to operations leads to improved patient
safety), there is reason to believe that there is a link. There is notably a relationship
between hospital employees’ perceptions of an organization's commitment to these
values and outcomes. Future research should examine the link between these values at the
organizational level (i.e., patient safety activities in place to support them), safety culture
and clinical outcomes.
In conclusion, it is difficult to say whether positive perceptions of safety culture
lead to improved patient safety or vice versa. It is the circular cause and consequence as
faced in the dilemma “which came first, the chicken or the egg?” A valid argument could
be made for both. However, the research presented here indicates that there is in fact a
relationship, and provides a first look at this seldom studied relationship. With this
information, it is hoped that organizations will be better prepared to address specific areas
of safety culture that may be contributing to poor patient safety, and thus, improve it in
the future.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF SAFETY CULTURE LITERATURE
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Table A.1
Empirical literature examining safety culture/climate in organizations
Source
Domain
Key findings
Armstrong &
Healthcare
 Total empowerment significantly positively
Laschinger
(40 healthcare
related to perceptions of patient safety culture.
(2006)
workers at a Magnet
 Patient safety climate most strongly related to
hospital)
access to support (feedback), informal power
(strong alliances), and opportunity to learn
and grow (continuous learning).
 Structural empowerment and Magnet hospital
characteristics together are a significant
predictor of staff nurses’ perceptions of
patient safety climate.
Brown &
Production workers
 Three-factor safety climate: risk, management
Holmes (1986) in 10 manufacturing
concern, and management action found to be
companies (n= 425,
a better fit than Zohar’s (1980) 8-factor
of those 200 had
model.
suffered an accident
 Post-traumatic group’s perceptions of risk,
in the past year and
management concerns, and management
225 had not)
actions were significantly lower than pretraumatic group.
Brown, Willis, Steel industry (n=
 Safety climate was negatively related to
& Prussia
551 workforce,
supervisory pressure.
(2000)
69%)Soft drink
 Knowledge and motivation predict
bottling factory (n=
compliance and participation.
97 employees)
 Relationship between knowledge and
compliance is stronger than that of knowledge
and participation.
 Safety climate influences knowledge and
motivation.
 Safety climate influences participation.
 Relationship between organizational climate
and safety performance is mediated by safety
climate, knowledge, and motivation.
Burns, Mearns, UK gas plant
 Authors looked at trust as a factor related to
& McGeorge
safety culture.
(2006)
 On explicit measures, employees trusted their
coworkers, supervisors and plant managers.
 When implicit measures were used, trust was
only found for coworkers.
 The authors consider that trust and distrust
may be different constructs.
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Source
Carroll (1998)

Domain
Nuclear power plant
(n= 130)

Castle (2006);
Castle,
Handler,
Engberg, &
Sonon (2007)

Healthcare
(n= 1579 nurse aides
at 72 nursing homes)

Catchpole et al. Healthcare
(2006)
(24 paediatric cardiac
cases)

Cheyne et al.
(1998)

Multinational
manufacturing (n=
915)

Cheyne et al.
(1999)

Manufacturing, dairy
produce, transport,
workforce (n= 2429)

Key findings
 The results of the safety culture survey and
group interviews were fed back to
management as part of the culture
improvement process.
 Results showed that management behaviors
were too hierarchical and the role of the
supervisor was under minded, despite the
findings of a healthy culture.
 Employees were worried about being blamed
for mistakes and there was a lack of positive
reinforcement for safety behaviors.
 Patient safety culture ratings at nursing homes
were significantly lower than benchmark
ratings at a hospital setting.
 In facilities with higher registered nurse
staffing levels, higher safety culture scores
were given.
 366 failures recorded.
 Cultural and organizational threats were most
frequently encountered single type of threat
(associated with 85 or 23% of failures).
 Task threats (33 or 9% of failures) often
appeared in combination with patient (87 or
24%) and environmental (19 or 5%) threats.
 Patient threats always appeared with task
threats.
 Environmental threats accounted for 54 or
15% of failures and another 12 or 3% of
failures when combined with environmental
and cultural/organizational threats.
 Employee attitudes to management directly
influenced safety activities and indirectly
influence individual responsibilities for
safety.
 Appraisals of commitment were strongly
predicted by management actions and
responsibility and less strongly predicted by
quality of safety training in all samples.
 There was also a strong reciprocal
relationship between these predictors.
 Attitudes to management actions were related
to personal actions and responsibility in
manufacturing and dairy produce, but not in
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Source

Domain

Clarke (1999)

Train operating
companies (train
drivers: n= 186;
supervisors: n= 55;
senior managers: n=
71)

Cox & Cox
(1991)

Gas company depots
(n= 630)

Cox et al.
(1998)

13 manufacturing
companies (n= 3329)

Cox, Jones, &
Collinson
(2006)

Nuclear and Offshore
oil
(2 case studies)

Key findings
transport.
 There was a weak but significant negative
relationship between training and personal
actions and responsibility across all 3 samples
 Evidence that the architecture of safety
climate was not stable across industries.
 A novel method was used to examine the
degree of shared perceptions of culture
between workers, supervisors, and managers.
 Each level was aware that shared safety
priorities did not exist.
 In-group perceptions were not always
accurate and were sometimes biased.
 There was partial support that workers base
their perceptions of senior managers on their
perceptions of local management and
supervisors.
 Based on the factor analysis and framework
suggested by Purdham (1984, as cited in Cox
and Cox, 1991), a theoretical model
emphasizing the shared aspects of employee
attitudes to safety is presented.
 Managers, supervisors, and temporary
workers had generally lower perceptions than
permanent workers.
 Management actions for safety were the
strongest predictor of employee appraisals of
organizational safety, followed by training
and personal actions.
 SEM analysis found that personal actions
emerged as stronger predictors than training,
although there is a strong reciprocal
relationship between them.
 Management actions were the only predictor
of personal actions.
 In nuclear case, trust was critical in the
development and sustainability of a safety
culture based upon error reporting, individual
and organizational learning, and perceived
need for a ‘just’ culture.
 Individuals encouraged to take responsibility
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Source

Domain

Coyle et al.
(1995)

Clerical and service
organizations (n=
880)

Dedobbeleer &
Beland (1991)

9 construction
companies (n= 384)

DeJoy,
Schaffer,
Wilson,
Vandenberg, &
Butts (2004)

Retail
(n= 2208 employees
at 21 retail units)

Key findings
for safety within the organization and to
develop a question and challenge culture.
 In offshore oil case, low levels of trust
negatively impacted safety culture through
poor cooperation and communication among
employees and managers.
 Low trust reinforced a culture of blame and
non-reporting of safety-related information.
 Safety climate factors were not stable across
organizations.
 Glennon’s (1982, as cited in Coyle et al.,
1995) findings that nine factors would be
universal was not supported since the factors
structures of organization 1 did not match
organization 2.
 Results also did not support Brown and
Holmes’ (1986) universal 3 factors.
 Attempts to validate previous research by
Zohar (1980); Brown and Holmes (1986).
 Brown and Holmes 3-factor model was
supported by the data but a new 2-factor
model proved an even better fit.
 The 2 factors of management commitment
and workers involvement were correlated .61.
 The questionnaire only comprised nine
questions, roughly one question to represent
each factor from Zohar’s solution.
 Negative relationship between environmental
exposures (heat, noise, lighting) and safety
climate.
 Safety policies and programs positively and
significantly contributed to safety climate.
 Organizational climate factors (e.g.,
communication, involvement) had a
significant positive relationship with safety
climate.
 Environmental exposure, safety policies and
programs, organizational support, and
participation-others were each significantly
related to safety at work.
 Environmental exposures, safety policies and
programs, organizational support, coworker
support, and communication were each
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Source

Demiris,
Patrick &
Boren (2004)

DePasquale &
Geller (1999)

Domain

Key findings
significant predictors of safety climate.
 Safety climate is not a mediator between
participation-others and safety at work.
 Environmental conditions, safety policies and
programs, and organizational climate
accounted for 55% of the variance in safety
climate.
Healthcare
 3 administrators versus 13 healthcare
(n= 16 administrators
providers agreed that there was a timely
and 14 health car
response to adverse event reports.
providers from 6
 8 of 16 administrators stated that the current
rural hospitals in
mechanism for event reporting is appropriate
Missouri)
and adequate for ensuring patient safety. Only
3 of 14 healthcare providers agreed.
 12 of 16 administrators and 13 of 14
healthcare providers agreed that events are
under reported.
 10 of 14 healthcare providers believed there
was no culture of blame that was regularly
placed on individuals involved in medical
errors.
20 industrial sites
 Factors determined to be critical to BBS
success.
implementing
behavior-based safety  Allow time for employees to get used to being
observed and receiving feedback.
programs (BBS)
 Trainers must be clear that program is not a
place to blame or criticize others.
 Interpersonal trust is important.
 Continued support from management is
essential.
 Employee involvement in training is
necessary.
 Trust in management’s ability to facilitate and
support BBS is important.
 Steering committee must be in touch with
what employees need to improve safety.
 Other findings:
 Mandatory BBS programs vs. voluntary
programs use more positive feedback.
 Mandatory vs. voluntary demonstrate greater
levels of trust in management and coworkers.
 Increased employee involvement leads to
more trust and vice versa.
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Source

Domain

Desai, Roberts,
& Ciavarelli
(2006)

US Naval flight
squadrons (6361
pilots, flight officers,
and other aircrew in
147 squadrons)

Diaz &
Cabrera (1997)

Aviation
(166 airport
personnel from 3
companies)

Donald &
Canter (1994)

10 chemical sites (n=
701)

Forgaty &
Shaw (2003)

Aircraft maintenance

Key findings
 Greater experience with observation and
feedback leads to more trust.
 Minor or intermediately severe accidents were
positively related with future safety climate
scores.
 No effect was found for severe accidents.

 Overall, safety climate appears to be related
to general safety levels.
 Organizations with higher safety levels had
higher safety climate scores and more positive
safety attitudes.
 Organizational policies and practices are
related to workers’ global perceptions and
safety climate.
 Likely that safety policies impact behaviors.
 Significantly significant relationship between
safety attitudes and safety climate.
 Attitudes appear to be better predictor of
climate than climate of attitudes.
 Employees perceptions regarding the
importance given towards organizational
philosophy is critical for productivity and
safety.
 Specific findings:
 Ramp workers had significantly lower
positive attitudes than non-ramp workers.
 Significant differences found between
companies regarding safety factors.
 Strong relationship between safety climate
and self-reported accidents.
 Correlations ranged from -.45 to -.83, p < .05.
 Attitudes toward safety reports were the only
item not to correlate with self-reported
accidents.
 Examined the relationship between safety
climate and violation behaviors.
 Management attitudes and group norms found
to be predictors of violation behavior.
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Source
Gaba, Singer,
Sinaiko,
Bowen, &
Ciavarelli
(2003)
Galvan, Bacha,
Mohr, &
Barach (2005)

Domain
Naval aviation and
healthcare

Key findings
 Significant differences found between
aviators and healthcare providers.
 Level of problematic response 12 times
greater for hospital workers than aviators.

Healthcare
(all pediatric cardiac
surgery team
members)

Garavan &
O’Brien (2001)

Manufacturing
(n= 1240 employees
in 25 companies)

 Preliminary results from the safety survey
suggest a lack of awareness to patient safety
hazard as well as lack of awareness of the
various ways to keep children from being
harmed in the OR.
 Gender does not appear to have a significant
effect on safety climate overall. Gender did
have a significant effect on extent to which
employees are likely to perceive that safety
climate promotes ownership of and
participation in safety issues, particular
beliefs about people who have accidents, and
strict adherence to rules and procedures; level
of management commitment to safety; degree
of riskiness in the job.
 Participation in safety training does not
appear to have a significant effect on
employees’ perception of overall safety
climate in the organization, but did have a
significant effect on extent to which
employees perceive that safety climate
promotes ownership of and participation in
safety issues, extent to which climate contains
negative stereotypes about safety conscious
employees, beliefs about people who typically
have accidents, and perception of
management commitment to health and
safety.
 Job title had a significant effect on
perceptions of overall safety climate,
perceptions of ownership of and participation
in safety, perceived riskiness of the job,
perception of the existence of specific
strategies for safety, beliefs regarding the
extent of proactive approaches to safety,
perception that management has sole
ownership of safety, and perception of strict
adherence to rules.
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Source

Domain

Key findings
 Age had a significant effect on extent of
negative stereotypes about safety conscious
employees, perceptions of proactive
approaches to safety, and extent of
perceptions of management commitment to
safety.
 Organizational tenure had a significant effect
on extent of negative stereotypes about safety
conscious employees and level of riskiness in
the job.
 Accident history had a significant effect on
perceptions of management commitment to
safety, perceived riskiness of the job, and
perceived extent of strict adherence to roles
for those who engage in unsafe work
behavior.
 For employees involved in a near accident in
last 12 months, this had a significant effect on
perception of management commitment to
safety, perceived riskiness on the job, beliefs
about accident proneness, individual
perceptions that specific strategies exist for
safety, perception that management has sole
ownership of safety and belief that employees
possess the capacity to be safety conscious.
 Participation in safety training had a
significant effect on stereotyping, ownership
and participation in safety, beliefs about
people who typically have accidents and
perception of management commitment to
safety.
 Age was significant in relation to engagement
in preventative safety behaviors and
communication of unsafe work conditions, as
well as breaking safety rules (a negative
behavior).
 Organizational tenure had a significant effect
on communication of unsafe work conditions
and engagement in risky behavior.
 Gender was significant in relation to attention
to rules and procedures, good housekeeping
practice, and engaging in preventative safety
behavior.
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Source

Domain

Garnerin,
HuchetBelouard,
Diby, &
Clergue (2006)

Healthcare
(case study)

Glendon &
Litherland
(2001)

Road construction

Griffin & Neal
(2000)

Manufacturing and
mining organizations
(study 1: n= 1264
employees; study 2:

Key findings
 Job title was significant in relation to positive
response to hazardous situations,
communication of unsafe work conditions,
proper use of equipment, engagement in
preventative safety behavior, good
housekeeping practices, and attention to rules
and procedures.
 Participation in safety training had a
significant effect on safety behaviors
(communication, preventive safety behavior,
and attention to rules and procedures).
 Management commitment to safety was
positively and significantly correlated with
safe behaviors and negatively correlated with
unsafe behaviors.
 Overall, when employees have more positive
perceptions of safety climate, they are less
likely to engage in unsafe behaviors.
 Used a multidisciplinary system analysis to
identify care-delivery problems and
contributory factors.
 3 care-delivery problems were identified:
patient equipped with wrong pump when
transferred from ICU to surgical ward, error
made when substituting pumps in order to
continue treatment, and replacement of
incorrect pump was delayed.
 Corrective actions: increase number of
necessary pumps within units, train nurses on
appropriate knowledge to administer pumps,
clarified medical responsibilities to avoid
delays.
 No relationship found between safety climate
and behaviors.
 Some safety climate factors may be stable
across organizations and industries (adequacy
of procedures, work pressure, personal
protective equipment, relationships, and
safety rules).
 Study 1: Safety climate showed a direct and
positive relationship with both safety
compliance and safety participation.
 Results suggest a difference between safety
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Source

Domain
n= 326 employees)

Harvey et al.
(2001)

Nuclear
(Pre safety training:
n= 417; post safety
training: n= 480)

Harvey et al.
(2002)

Nuclear
(n= 1003 employees
at 2 plants)

Hignett &
Crumpton
(2007)

Healthcare
(n= 64 nurses, 4 from
16 organization)

Key findings
compliance (e.g., uses protective equipment)
and safety participation (e.g., participates in
safety requirements development).
 Study 2 (authors suggest further investigation
of these results): Safety climate is likely to
influence safety participation through safety
knowledge and participation motivation.
 Compliance motivation is negatively related
to safety participation.
 Managers’ scores were significantly higher
than shop floor employees at T1 and T2 in
terms of perceived management style and
communication, responsibility, commitment
and involvement, job satisfaction, and risk
awareness.
 Managers’ scores increased on 5 of 6 factors
between T1 and T2 but were only significant
on perceived management style and
communication and complacency.
 Shop floor employees only showed a
significant change on job satisfaction between
T1 and T2 and this was in the negative
direction.
 Safety culture differs between shop floor and
management employees.
 Overall, shop floor employees viewed
management communication, management
commitment to safety, personal responsibility
for safety and being listened to, more
negatively than management employees.
 Shop floor employees at Plant A viewed
management and greater risk awareness and
risk taking more positively than management.
 Shop floor employees at Plant B had more
negative views regarding management and
lower job satisfaction than management.
 Job satisfaction appeared to have greatest
impact on perceptions of safety.
 Safety culture scores ranged from 17-77%
(average of 47%) (i.e., % compliance with
RCN competencies).
 For the sitting-to-standing task, 32
participants from organizations with an
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Source

Domain

Hofmann &
Mark (2006)

Healthcare (1127
nurses in 81 medicalsurgical units in 42
hospitals)

Hofmann &
Stetzer (1996)

Chemical processing
(sample 21 teams and
222 individuals)

Hofmann &
Stetzer (1998)

Utility company
(sample 1: 1520
workers and

Key findings
average score of 51% chose to use the
handling belt/sling, which has the lower
postural risk (REBA= 3.4) than others.
 The average organizational score of
participants choosing the manual technique,
which has greater postural risk (REBA= 7.4),
was 39%. The manual technique is only 20
secs faster than belt.
 Participants who chose the manual technique
made fewer decisions and showed less
evidence of problem solving than those who
chose the handling belt/sling.
 For the repositioning-in-sitting task,
participants from higher scoring organizations
(56% compliance) chose the hoist, midscoring organizations (47%) chose the belt or
manual techniques, and low scoring (33%)
chose slide sheets. Hoist is the recommended
method whereas manual is not accepted
unless patient can take most of their weight.
 Overall results indicated in organizations with
more positive safety culture, nurses
demonstrated more complex decision making
about patient handling and had lower levels of
postural risk.
 Overall safety climate was significantly
related to medication errors, urinary tract
infections, nurse back injuries, patient
satisfaction, patient perceptions of nurse
responsiveness, and nurse satisfaction.
 Role overload, group processes, safety
climate, and intentions to approach were
related to unsafe behaviours.
 Intentions to approach mediated the
relationship between group processes and
unsafe behaviours.
 At the group level, safety climate, group
processes, intentions to approach, and unsafe
behaviors were related to OSHA recordable
accidents.
 Supervisors made more internal attributions to
accidents than workers.
 Groups in which safety information was
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Source

Domain
supervisors; sample
2: 735 workers and
supervisors)

Huang (2007)

Healthcare (n= 4 ICU
units)

Hughes &
Lapane (2006)

Healthcare
(n= 367 nurses and
636 nursing
assistants)

Jarvinen &
Karwowski
(1995)

Manufacturing
(Advanced
Manufacturing
Systems)

Key findings
openly communicated are more likely to
make internal casual attributions when the
worker was implicated by the evidence.
 Groups in which safety information was not
openly communicated showed a restriction of
information flow.
 Safety climate did not moderate the
relationship between informational cues
received and attributions made.
 Nurses had lower scores on the SAQ when
compared to physicians. However, across the
board, scores were low on all six patient
safety factors.
 Only 11% of nurses and 13% of nursing
assistants gave excellent safety grades for
their facility; 5% of both groups gave a
failing/poor grade.
 Length of employment (less or more than 1
year) did not have a significant impact on
safety ratings. However, those employed for
more than 1 year were more likely to report
that staff worked as a team and units
cooperated well.
 Third shift employees were least likely to give
their department an overall very good or
acceptable grade.
 More nursing assistants (25% vs. 18%)
indicated that reporting a safety incident
seems like the person is being written up
rather than the problem. More nurses (42%
vs. 36%), however, indicate that the reporting
of errors of another staff member was seen as
a personal attack against them.
 Individual involved (operator-67%;
maintenance/ repair-20%; laborer-8%).
 Activity at time of accident (clearing
blockage-18%; loading/unloading-16%; fault
finding-15%; making adjustments-13%).
 Type of accident (pinch-point-75%; impact19%; other-6%).
 Operating mode (automatic-55%; manual19%; stopped, not isolated-16%).
 Automated equipment movement
113

Source

Jeffcott,
Pidgeon,
Weyman, &
Walls (2006)

Domain

Railway
(N= 500+ staff and
40 senior staff)

Key findings
(programmed or normal-57%; unexpected24%; sensor inadvertently activated-12%).
 Equipment safeguarding (safeguard defeated25%; allowed access to hazard zone-22%; no
or inadequate interlock-17%; no guard-16%;
guard removed-11%).
 Factors identified as relating to accidents
(improper procedures followed-44%; human
error-38%; incompatible workplace layout27%; incompatible controls-25%; lack of
awareness-20%; inadequate training-16%).
 Since the 1993 privatization and
organizational restructuring of the UK railway
industry, there have been important
repercussions for safety culture and trust
relationships.
 Fragmentation has led to potential for
tensions to develop across various
organizational interfaces.
 Performance regime has led to an increased
focus on performance and attribution of
blame for underperformance has emerged.
 Proceduralization was primarily motivated by
self-preservation within a culture focused on
accountability.
 The principles of career advancement based
upon tenure and long established
apprenticeship system have been replaced
with targeted recruitment, higher turnover of
staff, and classroom-based learning. Concern
over the loss of conceptual understandings of
railway rules, procedures and operating
practices in new, nonrail recruits.
 Accidents have formed a crucial determinant
of attitudes, relationships, and culture
throughout the sector. Led to a risk-based
approach in favor of an overcautious one,
allowing risk aversion to dominate decision
making. There is also a fear of prosecution
which has pressured staff to maintain
exemplary levels of competence.
 Over reliance on formal procedures and audits
of performance are felt to only foster and
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Source

Jiang & Gainer
(1987)

Domain

Organizations using
robots

Katz-Navon,
Healthcare (n= 632
Naveh, & Stern providers in 47
(2005)
hospital untis)

Lee & Harrison Nuclear
(2000)
(n= 70+ staff and
managers)

Key findings
create distrust.
 Overall, train operating companies appear
more rigid rather than flexible, have
deficiencies relating to perceptions of
management commitment, and lack of
consistently open/ communicative
environment to foster learning.
 Positives of privatization: improved training,
improved working relationships (formal and
informal), attempt to realign operating
companies’ goals with overall infrastructure
management.
 Individual involved (operator-72%;
maintenance-9%; programmers-9%).
 Type of accident (pinch-point-56%; impact44%).
 Factors relating to cause of accidents (human
error-41%; inappropriate/poor workplace
design-63%; robot design-22%).
 Overall findings: largest causal factor of
accidents was inadequate, poor, or nonexistent methods to safeguard employees.
 Study found that the priority of safety
moderated the curvilinear relationship
between safety procedures and the number of
a unit’s treatment errors, and the linear
relationship between managerial safety
practices and the number of a unit’s treatment
errors.
 When safety was a high rather than low
priority, there were fewer treatment errors
when procedures were perceived as either
insufficient or overly detailed.
 Younger workers’ positive attitudes were
attributed to less time on the job and begin on
a positive note, and older workers have the
most positive attitudes which was correlated
with higher level staff positions. Most
negative attitudes found in the 30-40 age
range.
 Age had a significant influence for some job
types in terms of job satisfaction, perceived
empowerment, organizational risk level,
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Source

Domain

Lee (1998)

Nuclear reprocessing
plant (n= 5296)

Lymer, Richt,
& Isaksson
(2004)

Healthcare
(n= 9 nurses and 6
nursing assistants)

Key findings
satisfaction with contractor safety, and respect
for contractors’ role.
 Women had more positive attitudes towards
safety than men, significant on 19 attitudinal
variables. Women were significantly more
negative in terms of personal risk than men.
Women and office workers, however, don’t
typically work in high hazard areas.
 Shift workers were almost uniformly more
negative than day workers, significant on 23
of 28 factors. Shift workers were significantly
more positive (cautious) regarding personal
risk than day workers. Shift workers are less
prone to personal stress but report lower
satisfaction with job relationships. Shift
workers less confident in the organizational
risk level and safety standards.
 Senior managers are reported to put the most
pressure on employees and colleagues and
safety reps are seen as most likely source of
suggestions to improve safety.
 Safety attitudes were highly correlated with
attention given to safety in team briefings and
management style.
 Most factors identified discriminated between
accident and non-accident groups.
 Nineteen factors were identified:
 1 factor: safety procedures
 3 factors: risks
 3 factors: permit to work
 4 factors: job satisfaction
 2 factors: safety rules
 1 factor: participation
 2 factors: training
 2 factors: control
 1 factor: design
 When discussing things contributing to good
safety culture, healthcare workers commonly
referred to: people, type of work, equipment
and events.
 In wards where patients with blood-borne
pathogens are frequently treated, a more
rigorous safety climate developed compared
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Source

Domain

Makary et al.
(2006)

Healthcare
(n= 2135 surgical
providers—surgeons,
OR nurses, surgical
technicians,
anesthesiologists,
CRNAs—from 60
hospitals)

McCarthy &
Blumenthal
(2006)

Healthcare
(n= 6 case studies)

Key findings
to other wards. Workers are constantly aware
that they are at risk.
 When there are many patients to take care of,
safe work practices are sacrificed to get the
job done. Reasons cited include less time to
prepare for a task and use of protective
equipment takes time away from next task
and next patient.
 2/3 of participants had experienced a bloodexposure incident and almost all knew of
someone who had. From those, only 2
reported the incident and took appropriate
infection avoidance procedures although it is
required.
 Poor reporting was related to a will to sustain
a positive self-image (don’t want to be
considered ‘clumsy’ or ‘unprofessional’),
complicated reporting instruments, and filing
papers is not considered their main task,
especially when time is sparse.
 Socialization into infection control,
routinization, stereotyping, perception of
patient wishes, presence of competing values
and norms, and a will of workers to solve
dilemmas were reported to undermine
compliant behavior and safety culture.
 Safety climate varied widely by hospital, but
not provider type.
 Safety climate scores in each hospital ranged
from 16.3% to 100% positive.
 6 of 7 safety climate items did not show
significant differences across provider type.
OR nurses were significantly less positive
about one item “I would feel safe being
treated here as a patient” than surgeons and
anesthesiologists.
 Sentara Norfolk General Hospital: baseline
assessment suggested 4 strategies to promote
safety-related behaviors: behavior-based
expectations, establishment of high priority
rules, conducting timely and rigorous ‘root
cause analysis’, and simplifying policies and
procedures.
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Source

Domain

Key findings
 Preliminary results indicate a 42% increase in
use of expected communications behaviors,
84% reduction in ventilator-associated
pneumonias and 63% decrease in the rate of
device-associated bloodstream infections.
 US Department of Veterans Affairs: main
components of safety program are:
establishing a non-punitive and confidential
approach to unintended error reporting,
encouraging reporting of adverse events and
close calls, training on easy to use computer
aided root cause analysis tools and cognitive
aids to analyze reported events, adapting a
systems engineering tool to uncover system
vulnerabilities and design and assess
improvements, and disseminating warnings
about threats and lessons learned.
 Results indicate nearly all root cause analyses
have been able to recommend a solution,
100% increase in perceived preventability of
events, shift in patient behavior and
professional training to HF and systems
issues.
 Kaiser Permanente: principle interventions
were: multidisciplinary patient rounds,
assertive and structured communication
techniques, communication escalation policy,
and team briefings before procedures and
debriefings after.
 After preoperative briefings instituted, no
wrong-site surgeries reported. Other reported
error management behaviors increased, such
as willingness to speak up about safety
concerns and report and discuss mistakes,
suggesting better situational awareness.
 Comparing safety attitudes scores, OR staff
perceived improvement in safety culture and
teamwork.
 Nurse turnover rate fell by 2/3.
 1 year after safety program instituted, labor
and delivery staff in all four perinatal sites
rated safety culture more highly than before.
 Missouri Baptist Medical Center: instituted
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Source

Domain

Key findings
rapid response teams.
 After 2 months of full implementation, calls
for rapid response teams increased to 70-80%
per month, 60% decrease in emergency calls
for respiratory arrest and similar crises, and
15% decrease in cardiac arrests, suggesting
acute crises being averted by early
intervention.
 Johns Hopkins Hospital: instituted the
Comprehensive Unit-based Safety Program
(CUSP), educating about evidenced-based
infection control practices and completing a
posttest, supply catheter insertion carts with
standardized supplies, follow checklist for
safety catheter insertion, empower nurses to
intervene, and prompt ICU team on daily
goals sheet to ask physicians if catheters can
be removed.
 Daily goals sheet led to an increased selfreported understanding of goals of care from
10% to 95%. Following implementation of
CUSP, average ICU length of stay fell by 1-2
days. After senior executives’ involvement,
documented catheter-related bloodstream
infections were eliminated, preventing an
estimated 43 infections and 8 deaths and
saving an estimated $2 million.
 OSF St. Joseph Medical Center: to reduce
errors, interviewed nurses to obtain
information regarding home medication use,
when patients transferred or discharged,
existing medications compared with those
ordered by physician to be continued, any
discrepancy must be resolved within 4-24
hours, and pharmacist reviews the patient’s
home medication use and physician orders to
detect and avoid errors.
 Following interventions, rate of adverse drug
events dropped by 91% and the hospital’s
perceived safety culture improved.
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Source
McDiarmid &
Condon (2005)

Domain
Healthcare

McDonald,
Aircraft Maintenance
Corrigan, Daly,
& Cromie
(2000)

McDonald,
Waring, &
Harrison
(2006)

Healthcare
(n= 14 consultantgrade surgeons, 12
consultant
anesthetists, and 13
departmental
mangers and
administrators)

Key findings
 Safety culture was found to help explain
instances of non-compliance to hazardous
drug guidelines.
 Safety climate differs between organizations.
 Safety climate differs across types of jobs
(aircraft techs safety climate significantly
lower than quality personnel/inspectors,
planning personnel, and graduate
engineers/management).
 Types of consequences for errors differed
significantly between organizations.
 Physicians expressed that day-to-day work
with patients could not easily be guided by
pre-determined rules.
 Physicians portrayed themselves as highly
competent professionals, able to work without
protocols or guidelines.
 Many physicians viewed guidelines as a tool
to help new staff because as specialized
consultants they already had the necessary
knowledge and experience.
 Managers, however, were supportive of
guidelines, rules and planning processes.
 Managers believe they may be the ‘guardians’
of the system, but at the end of the day they
have no control over what happens in the OR.
 Like managers, physicians as times portray
themselves as being placed in no-win
situations by having to choose between
unpalatable options.
 Physicians accepted that risk is inevitable and
they would make mistakes.
 Mistakes were viewed as bad luck rather than
inadequacies in individual performance or
knowledge.
 Concern that if physicians see mistakes as
inevitable that they are less likely to report
them if the purpose of reporting is to learn
from mistakes.
 There is a wide acceptance that there are
many ways to conduct a surgery, indicating
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Source
Mearns, et al.
(1998)

Domain
10 offshore oil
installations (n= 722)

Offshore oil and gas
Mearns, Flin,
Gordon, &
industry (13
Fleming (2001) installations; 722
workers responded to
surveys)

Mearns,
UK and Norwegian
Rundmo, Flin, offshore oil
installations
Gordon, &
Fleming (2004)
Modak et al.
(2007)

Healthcare
(ambulatory setting)

Naveh, KatzNavon & Stern
(2005; 2006)

Healthcare (n= 3
units; internal
medicine, surgery,
ICU)

Key findings
that physicians are unlikely to criticize
colleagues for ways that they do things.
 Employees who had not had an accident
reported significantly more safety behaviors,
job communication, and stronger attitudes
towards work.
 These employees were also happier with
accident prevention and mitigation measures
than the accident group.
 However, there were no significant
differences between accident prevention and
non-accident groups for the work climate
variables of work pressure or job security.
 There were also no differences in attitudes to
the onsite managers.
 The accident group was more positive
towards there own responsibility for safety.
 Results showed that the main predictor for
accident and near-misses is ‘unsafe behavior’.
 Perceived pressure for production was shown
to be the driver of unsafe behaviors.
 Satisfaction with safety measures was the best
predictor of feelings of safety with regard to
occupational hazards; workers appeared to not
feel unsafe with regards to major hazards due
to Offshore Safety Case legislation.
 Significant differences found in workers’
perceptions of safety between UK and
Norwegian sectors.
 The installations themselves explained more
variance than the sector did for all factors but
‘safety attitudes’.
 Physicians had least favorable attitudes about
management, while management had the best
attitudes.
 Respondents had similar attitudes about
teamwork climate, safety climate, job
satisfaction and working conditions.
 Employees who perceive procedures as
suitable and safety information as available
are more likely to report treatment errors.
 The three departments differed significantly
on these factors.
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Source
Neal & Griffin
(2006)

Neal, Griffin,
& Hart (2000)

Nielsen,
Cartensen, &
Rasmussen
(2006)
Niskanen
(1994a)

Niskanen
(1994b)

Domain
Healthcare

Key findings
 Results found that group safety climate
increased individual safety motivation. This
increase in turn boosted safety behavior, in
the form of participation.
 Group level changes in safety behaviors were
related to a reduction in accidents.
Healthcare
 Organizational climate predicted safety
(n= 525 employees
climate.
from 32 work groups  Safety knowledge and motivation predicted
at one hospital)
safety compliance and participation.
 The relationship between knowledge and
compliance was stronger than the relationship
between motivation and participation.
 Safety climate influenced both knowledge and
motivation.
 Safety climate, knowledge and motivation
mediated the relationship between
organizational climate and safety
performance.
 If improvements in safety climate are to
impact safety performance, must first change
knowledge and employee motivation.
Industrial plants (n=
 Implemented a new incident reporting scheme
2 plants)
at two industrial plants.
 The intervention worked in only one of the
plants which had a higher safety climate,
higher management support and also a greater
willingness to report incidents.
 Carelessness, being in a hurry, incorrect
Road maintenance,
safety observations, and lack of safety
workers, and
supervisors
knowledge were perceived to be important
(n= 193)
determinants of accidents.
 Attitudes of supervisors and co-workers and
manner of instruction were predictive of
safety feedback.
 Own actions, feedback, and safety judgments
were significant predictors of safety
knowledge and instructions.
Road construction, 85  Supervisors and workers had slightly different
workplaces (workers:
factor structures.
n= 1890; supervisors:  Supervisors in low accident workplaces rate
safety inspections better, rate their own
n= 562)
importance higher, emphasize safety over
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Source

Domain

O’Toole (2002) Mining and
construction
(n= 1414 plant
employees)
Ostrom et al.
(1993)

Nuclear energy
laboratory (n= 4000
administered across 5
departments)

Richter &
Koch (2004)

Manufacturing
(n= 1 case study
presented, but
compared it to 2
others)

Key findings
cost, and believe that accidents happen by
chance less.
 Workers in low accident workplaces value
their own roles higher, suffer more mental
stress, and report increased job responsibility
than their counterparts in high accident
workplaces.
 Most significant factor linked to the reduction
of injury rates is change in upper
management’s approach and emphasis on
safety leadership and commitment to safety.
 Appears to be a strong causal relationship
with a reduction in injury rates.
 One department had a higher number of
accidents than the others and was found to
have more negative attitudes towards the
availability and capability of safety personnel
but statistical analyses were not conducted
beyond descriptives.
 Suggestions were made for further
interpretation of the results but some tests
(e.g., t-tests, chi square, correlations) were
deemed too difficult to interrupt and would
not be of additional use to management so
were not conducted.
 Commonly understood that a chain of adverse
events would lead to an accident.
 Great deal of focus on economy and
productivity.
 Workers’ ability and qualifications to prevent
production problems were valued greatly by
themselves and management.
 There were barriers (unspecified) embedded
in the safety culture that limited the company
from analyzing and coming up with effective
safety measures.
 Not possible to detect a unified safety culture.
 Integration was a week element in safety
culture; differentiation and ambiguity are
much stronger.
 When compared to other companies,
variations in safety culture could be explained
by differences in job content, social relations
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Source

Domain

Key findings
and structures, combined with different
impacts of macro-cultures.
 Significant differences found between
provider position on the teamwork
collaboration factor—physicians were more
positive in their attitudes towards teamwork
than nurses; no differences found for other
providers.
 When compared to urban hospitals, mean
scores were higher for rural hospitals.
 Providers were satisfied with the quality of
collaboration, felt suggestions concerning
safety were acted upon by management, and
felt that leadership was driving their hospitals
to be safety centered.
 Management and employee commitment and
involvement in safety work was the strongest
predictor of satisfaction with safety measures.
 Perceptions of safety vs. production goals and
social support were also significant
predictors.
 Strong positive relationship between
management commitment and involvement.
 Survey is easily understandable and related to
safety.

Rudman,
Bailey, Garrett,
Peden,
Thomas, &
Brown (2006)

Healthcare (190
providers from 8
rural hospitals; ;
Safety Attitudes
Questionnaire
(SAQ))

Rundmo
(1994)

8 offshore oil
platforms from 5 oil
companies (n= 915)

Scalise (2005)

Healthcare (n= 1400
employees; survey
validation)
Healthcare
 Six factors: teamwork climate, job
satisfaction, perceptions of management,
(n= 10,843 healthcare
safety climate, working conditions and stress
workers; SAQ
recognition.
validation study)
 SAQ is highly reliable (ρ= .90) and
psychometrically sound.
 SAQ differs from other safety climate surveys
in four ways: (1) more widely used for a
longer period of time, (2) more psychometric
data is available, (3) maintains continuity with
its predecessor (FMAQ), and (4) preserved
item continuity with other high reliability
industries allowing for comparisons between
professionals and assists with search for
universal HF issues across professions.
Healthcare
 Overall problematic response to survey was
(n= 2989 healthcare
18%. When adding in neutral responses,

Sexton et al.
(2006)

Singer et al.
(2003)
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Source

Smith, Cohen,
Cohen, &
Cleveland
(1978)

Domain
workers)

7 pairs of plants:
wood and lumber
products, metals, and
manufacturing

Key findings
36.5%.
 Almost 52% believed that loss of experienced
personnel negatively affected their ability to
provide high quality care.
 Many indicated a lack of rewards for
identifying a serious mistake (33%) and fear
of punishment for making a mistake (28%).
39% witnessed a coworker do something
unsafe. 8% admitted doing something unsafe
for the patient in last year.
 The average overall problematic response
across all questions varied in individual
hospitals from 13% to 22%. For individual
questions, the range in problematic responses
varied from 6% to 38% between institutions.
 Clinicians, in general, were found to more
likely provide problematic responses than
non-clinicians.
 Senior managers in general were less likely to
give problematic responses than non-senior
managers.
 Clinician senior managers responded more
similarly to clinicians than non-clinician
senior managers (i.e., clinicians were more
negative than non-clinicians regardless of
management status).
 Among clinicians, nurses were most negative
and almost always responded more negatively
than non-clinicians.
 Overall, definite discrepancy between
attitudes and experiences of senior managers
Non-clinician senior managers answered
more often in ways consistent with a culture
of safety than did personnel who actually take
care of patients.
 Low accident plants had:
 Higher management commitment to the safety
program.
 A more humanistic approach to dealing with
employees.
 Better communication between first-line and
middle management.
 Closer personal relationships between
125

Source

Thomas,
Sexton,
Neilands,
Frankel, &
Helmreich
(2005)

Thompson et
al. (1998)

Tomas et al.
(1999)

Domain

Key findings
management and workforce.
 Better hazard control.
 There were no differences between low and
high accident plants with regards to training,
incident investigation, and policy statements.
Healthcare
 After executive walk rounds (EWRs), mean
(n= 1119 providers,
safety climate scores and percent positive
baseline; n= 1000
scores were not significantly different in
providers, post walk
control units and EWR units.
rounds)
 Nurses in control group had lower safety
climate scores than nurses in EWR group.
 5 items were hypothesized to be sensitive to
EWRs. Of those 5, all were significantly
different after the intervention in the EWR
group but not the control group.
 Nurses in the EWR group exhibited more
favorable evaluations of safety climate
through their responses to the individual
safety climate items than control group nurses
on 14 of 21 items.
 Overall, EWR appear to have an impact on
nurses’ perception of safety climate.
 Managers and supervisors play but different
2 aviation
manufacturing
roles in maintaining workplace safety.
 Managers influence through politics of
samples (1992: n=
communication and have a direct impact on
350; 1995: n= 329)
safety conditions.
 Supervisors influenced safety compliance
through fairness interaction.
 Data collected in 1992 was used to construct a
model which was confirmed with 1995 data
from the same organization.
 Models for 2 and 3 samples showed
‘High-risk’
companies, 3
acceptable fit to the data.
workforce samples
 Safety climate was a direct predictor of
supervisors’ response, and a weak non(1: n= 123; 2: n= 182;
significant predictor of work behavior and co3: n= 124; total: n=
worker response.
429
 Supervisors’ response was a central variable
in the models, and linked climate with worker
behavior.
 In turn, behavior combined with assessment
of hazards to influence perceptions of actual
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Source

Domain

van Vuuren
(2000)

Steel industry
(2 case studies
examined)

Williamson, et
al. (1997)

7 manufacturing sites
(n= 660, 42%)

Yassi et al.
(2005)

Healthcare

Zacharatos,
Barling, &
Iverson (2005)

Petroleum and
telecommunications
industries

Zohar (1980)

Factories
(5 from each field:
metal fabrication,
food processing,
chemical industry,

Key findings
risk, the only variable in the model to be
directly predictive of accidents.

 Organizational failure contributed to incident
causation 35 and 40% of the time.
 Of this, safety culture contributed to incident
causation 33 and 27% of the time.
 Safety attitudes contributed to incident
causation 67 and 85% of the time.
 Risk management initiatives originated from a
management level and affected entire
organization.
 Focus for improvement appeared to be on the
process rather than the end product.
 A 5-factor structure using factor analysis was
revealed and comprised of: motivation,
positive safety practices, risk justification,
fatalism, and optimism.
 Workers who had experience accidents
reported poorer safety practices, as well as
less rationalization of the risks in the
workplace.
 Workers who perceived dangers in the
workplace also tended to justify unsafe
working conditions and be more optimistic
regarding risks.
 The results support the hypothesis that safety
climate is a group-level construct.
 Results suggest that a positive safety climate
is one of the highest priority factors that
contribute to lowering the risk of healthcare
workers contracting SARS.
 Found that the 10 identified high-performance
management practices are related to
occupational safety.
 Safety climate and trust in management were
mediators of the relationship.
 Safety climate is a characteristic of industrial
organizations.
 Safety climate is related to general
organizational safety level.
 Management commitment and attitudes
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Source

Zohar (2000)

Domain
textile industry)

Key findings
toward safety is major factor influencing
success of safety programs.
 Perceived relevance of safety to job behavior
(i.e., importance of safety training and effects
of work pace on safety) is also major factor
influencing success of safety programs.
 Other factors influencing safety climate:
perceived status of safety committee (high vs.
low rank); perceived status of safety officer;
perceived effects of safe conduct on
promotion; perceived level of risk at work
place; and perceived effect of safe conduct on
social status.
Metal processing
 The results support the hypothesis that safety
plant (n= 534
climate is a group-level construct.
production workers in  Perceptions of supervisor safety practices
53 work groups)
varied between groups, but strong within
group homogeneity was found.
 Group perceptions of supervisor action and
supervisor expectation were significant
predictors of minor injuries within the subunit
(post-questionnaire).
 Lost-days accidents were negatively
correlated with perceptions of supervisor
expectations, but not with supervisor action.
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HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE

INSTRUCTIONS: This survey asks for your opinions about patient safety issues, medical errors, and
event reporting at Florida Hospital. Please answer all questions honestly by marking the appropriate box,
circling a number, or filling in the blank. Any information you provide is voluntary and will be kept strictly
confidential by researchers at UCF. Your responses will not be associated with your name in any way. The
survey will take about 10 to 15 minutes to complete.
•
•

An “event” is defined as any type of error, mistake, incident, accident, or
Deviation, regardless of whether or not it results in patient harm.
“Patient safety” is defined as the avoidance and prevention of patient injuries
or adverse events resulting from the processes of health care delivery.
Background and Experience Information

1. At which Florida Hospital campus do you primarily work?
 Orlando
 Altamonte
 East Orlando
 Kissimmee
 Celebration
 Winter Park
2. What is your primary work area or unit in this hospital? CHECK ONE.
 Many different
 NCC
 Behavioral Health
hospital units/No
 Rehabilitation
specific unit
 Medical Unit
 Laboratory
 Surgical Unit
(non-surgical)
 Operating Room
 Respiratory
 Cardiac Services
 Radiology
 Emergency
 Anesthesiology
 Nutritional Services
Department
 CCU
 Oncology
 CVICU
 Pediatric, General Unit
 ICU
 Peds PCU/ICU
 CV3
 Neonatal ICU




Apopka
Other, please specify:













Newborn
Environmental Services
Radiation Oncology
Pharmacy
Orthopedics
L&D
Post Partum
Material HR Unit
Ambulatory Care
Med/Surg Unit
Other, please specify:

3. How long have you worked in your current hospital work area/unit?
Less than 1 year
 11 to 15 years
 21 years or
1 to 5 years
 16 to 20 years
more
6 to 10 years





4. How many hours per shift do you typically work?
Less than 8 hours
9 or more hours but less than 12 hours
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12 or more hours but less than 16 hours
16 or more hours

5. What is your staff position in this hospital? Check ONE answer that BEST describes your staff position.
 Registered Nurse
 Dietician
 Physician Assistant/ Nurse Practitioner
 Unit assistant/Clerk Secretary
 LVN/LPN
 Respiratory Therapist
 Patient Care Assistant/Health Aide/ Sitter
 Physical, Occupational, or Speech Therapist
 Attending/Staff Physician
 Technical (e.g., EKG, Lab, Imaging)
 Resident Physician/Physician in Training
 Administration/Management
 Pharmacist
 Other, please specify:
6. In your staff position, do you typically have direct interaction or contact with patients? Check ONE.
 YES, I typically have direct interaction or contact with patients.
 NO, I typically do NOT have direct interaction or contact with patients.
7. How long have you worked in your current specialty or profession?
 Less than 1 year
 6 to 10 years
 1 to 5 years
 11 to 15 years




16 to 20 years
21 years or more

SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit
In this survey, think of your “unit” as the work area, department, or clinical area of the hospital where you
spend most of your work time or provide most of your clinical services. Please indicate your agreement or
disagreement with the following statements about your work area/unit. Mark your answers by circling a number.

Think about your hospital work are/unit…
1. People support one another in this unit
2. We have enough staff to handle the workload
3. When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together
as a team to get the work done
4. In this unit, people treat each other with respect
5. Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care
6. We are actively doing things to improve patient safety
7. We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care
8. Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them
9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here
10. It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here
11. When one area in this unit gets really busy others help out
12. When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not
the problem.
13. After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate
their effectiveness
14. We work in “crisis mode” trying to do too much, too quickly
15. Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done
16. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file
17. We have patient safety problems in this unit
18. Our procedure and systems are good at preventing errors from happening
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Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neither
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3

Agree
4
4
4

Strongly
Agree
5
5
5

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

1

2

3

4

5

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

SECTION B: Your Supervisor/Manager
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your immediate
supervisor/manager or person to whom you directly report. Mark your answers by circling a number.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree
1. My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done
according to established patient safety procedures
2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers safety suggestions for
improving patient safety
3. Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work
faster, even if it means taking shortcuts
4. My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen
over and over

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

SECTION C: Communications
How often do the following things happen in your work area/unit? Mark your answer by circling a number.
Most of
Never Rarely Sometimes the Time Always N/A

Think about your hospital work area/unit…

1. We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event
reports.
2. Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect
patient care.
3. We are informed about errors that happen in this unit.
4. Staff feels free to question the decisions or actions of those with more
authority.
5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again.
6. Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right

1

2

3

4

5

0

1

2

3

4

5

0

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

0
0

SECTION D: Frequency of Events Reported
In your hospital work are/unit, when the following mistakes happen, how often are they reported? Mark your
answer by circling a number.
Most of
Never Rarely Sometimes the Time Always N/A
1
2
3
4
5
0
1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before
affecting the patient, how often is this reported?
1
2
3
4
5
0
2. When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient,
how often is this reported?
2
3
4
5
0
3. When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, 1
how often is this reported?
SECTION E: Patient Safety Grade
Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety. Mark ONE answer.
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο

A Excellent
B Very Good
C Acceptable
D Poor
E Failing
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SECTION F: Your Hospital
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your hospital. Mark your
answer by circling a number.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Agree

Think about your hospital…
1. Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient
safety
2. Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other
3. Things “fall between the cracks” when transforming patients from one
unit to another
4. There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work
together.
5. Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes
6. It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units
7. Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units
8. The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top
priority.
9. Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an
adverse event happens
10. Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients
11. Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital

1

2

3

4

5

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

1

2

3

4

5

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

1

2

3

4

5

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

SECTION G: Number of Events Reported
In the past 12 months, how many event reports have you filled out and submitted? Mark ONE answer.

Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο

No event reports
1 to 2 event reports
3 to 5 event reports
6 to 10 event reports
11 to 20 event reports
21 event reports or more

Please feel free to write any comment about patient safety, errors, or event reporting in your hospital.
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